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WHAT'S ALL THE SHOOTING ABOUT?
NOW WE KNOW-
In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc.1
7
By ROBERT M. VILES*
I. PROPoSmION
It is high time for those of us who teach, preach, scribble, or
perish to pay more attention to the people we teach to than the
peers we preach to. If we must scribble to teach, why not teach by,
of, and for our scribbling? Therefore and forthwith a return to
First Principles, Fundamental Truths, and Piercing Insights. 8
' Bok John, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on
the Corporate Indenture, 69 YAT.a L.J. 203 (1959).2 Braucher, Robert, Creditors" Rights Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 2-Sales, 67 Com. L.J. 218 (1962).
3 Coogan, Peter, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203 (1959); Operating Under Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Without Help or Hindrance of the "Floating
Lien," 15 Bus. LAw. 373 (1960); Public Notice Under the Uniform Cor-
iercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including 'Note Filing,' 47
IowA L. _Ev. 289 (1962); The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions
Under the Code, 69 Micn. L. REv. 685 (1962); Security Interests in Fixtures
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1319 (1962).
4 Countryman, Vern, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial
Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAw & Coirvxar. PROB. 76
(1951).5 Forman, Leon, Bankruptcy Trustee Defeats Sellers Right of Reclamation
under the Commercial Code, 32 PA. B.A.Q. 77 (1960).
6 Friedman, Harold, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired
Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194 (1959).
7 Gordon, Nahum, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COL. L. 1REV. 49
(1962).
(Continued on next page)
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II. ALLEGORY
Mrs. Coolidge, in the White House sitting room:
"Calvin, what was the minister's sermon about today?"
President Coolidge, just returned from church: "Sin."
Mrs. C: "Well, what'd he have to say about it?"
C: "He's against it."19
Something of the same colloquy might well take place between
a puzzled creditor's rights student and his instructor: "What are
sections 60, 67, and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act all about?" In-
structor: "Fraud." Student: "Well, whadda they say about fraud?"
Instructor: "They're agin' it." This response avoids the issue-and
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
8 Hawkland, William, The Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and Defrauded
Sellers-Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz
Case, 67 Com. L.J. 86 (1962).
9 Henson, Ray, Proceeds Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoL. L.
REV. 232 (1965). Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section
60(a) of the BankJruptcy Act Reconciled, 21 Bus. LAw. 371 (1966).0 Hiller, Russell, How the Codes Secured Transactions Have Fared in the
Bankruptcy Courts, 19 Bus. LAw. 57 (1963).
11 Hogan, William, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors, 17
STAN. L. REv. 822 (1965).
12 _Kennedy, Frank, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RtrrGEas L. REv.
518 (1960); The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Insolvency: Article
9, 67 Cob!. LJ. 113 (1962).
13 King, Lawrence, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Does It
Insulate the Security Interest from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 1117 (1966).
14 Levy, Harry, Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Bankruptcy
Law and Procedure, 60 Com. LJ. 9 (1955).
15 Reimer, Bernard, Bankruptcy-Preference-Conflict Between Section 9-108
of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60(a) of Bankruptcy Act, 70 Com.
L.J. 63 (1965); The After-Acquired Property Clause Revisited, 70 Com. LJ.
334 (1965).
16 Schwartz, Max, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Secured
Financing Transactions and Bankruptcy, 38 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 50 (1963).
17 3 UCC REP. 194 (1966).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
18 Translation: This monograph began as a handout to the author's students
in creditors' rights course in the spring semester of 1966. It was an attempt to aid
them in understanding the basic relationship, or lack of relationship, between the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act and in grasping the nature
of some of the problems that have arisen. With the appearance of the Portland
Newspaper decision and the opportunity for some second thoughts and further
investigation the handout has been substantially altered and rewritten. Most of
what is proclaimed below is not in any way original, although it is the product
of original thinking. Somewhat to his disappointment, the author has found that
he has been both anticipated and excelled by such authors as Professor Frank
Kennedy, op. cit. supra note 12. To them he offers his sincere respect and
gratitude. However, the monograph retains the original purpose and spirit with-
out dilution.
19 Reprinted without permission from an old copy of Reader's Digest.
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the endless perorations in answer to it-in the same way that
taciturn Cal's answer effectively precluded any extended rehearing
of the minister's sermon. However, the setting-aside provisions of
the Act fly as much under the banner of "fraud" as a clergyman's
preoccupation with social ethics comes under the rubric of "sin."
Certain types of conduct are proscribed by the Rightthinking side
of almost everybody, whether commercial men dealing in business
and financial transactions or church-goers concerned with their
own (and others') ways of life.
It is impracticable, however, for most persons to engage very
much time in Rightthinking, and divisions of labor have de-
veloped whereby an organized corps of Rightthinkers has arisen
to prosecute the interests of Rightthinking on behalf of everybody
else, who is relieved to pass on this responsibility. Thus our
society supports ministers and trustees in bankruptcy, and heaven-
ly and earthly referees, and courts of appeal.
In an excess of professional zeal, Rightthinking can be carried
to such an extreme that ordinary, everyday-accepted conduct comes
under attack and proscription as sinful or fraudulent. The in-
terests of nice, innocent people-their liquor stores or accounts
receivable financing-are endangered though their hearts are no
deeper gray than the hearts of average, reasonable, and reverent
men. If life is to continue as it has previously been known and
unquestioned, something has to be done about these upsets.
There are two alternative ways to set things aright: either the
tainted conduct must be changed and thus purged of sinful or
fraudulent implications, or the doctrine of sin or fraud must be
redefined and restructured. Both conversions can be accomplished
only by clever men, who effectively represent their clients' inter-
ests without bringing down the wrath of the Holy Men and raising
the hackles of Rightthinking as it lies dormant in the hearts of
those not immediately affected by the excesses of professional
righteousness.
It is unquestionable that the reconciliators of sin and virtue
are far more sophisticated than their counterparts in the world of
commercial fraud and fair dealing. After all, the theologians have
had many centuries of continuous advancement in building up
great erudition in distinctions by class, sinfulness by degree, hier-
archies by level, and purgation by successive steps. Some mortal
[Vol. 55,
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acts are void for the immorality of their very nature; others are
merely voidable for contravention of earthly rules of man's own
manufacture. And there is always a Way Out.
In the province of business and commerce the present state of
affairs is not far removed from the not-so-long-ago of open fights
between agents of the devil-creditor and the angels-eh, sheriffs-
of the law. Discharge-in-bankruptcy and the rest of the heavenly
hereafter for death-by-insolvency was discovered only a hundred or
so years ago, and the waystations of commercial purgatory are yet
being mapped. The priesthood, however, has secured its position
quickly and well, aided by frequent bulls from courts of appeal
and periodic recompilations of the Holy Word by councils of law-
givers. The compass of fraud has spread over a vast range of con-
duct-far beyond the most righteous contemplation of at least
some commercial communicants, and dark tales of the persecution
of the innocent have continually sounded.
It is a harmless overstatement to say that the commercial com-
munity has been rent into two camps, each attended by a comple-
ment of pharisees and sadducees. One, whom for lack of a better
label we shall call the Unsecured Creditors, has basked in the pro-
tection of the holyword and its interpreters, discovering and en-
joying the profits of the sin-eh, fraud-of the opposing camp, the
Secured Creditors. These bad men-bad in the eyes of the Holy
Men and the interpreters of scripture-have been struck down for
their fraudulent acts and, on the day of final accounting, have been
deprived of the fruits thereof. They have lost battle after battle,
winning only occasionally, and then only after enduring the heavy
costs of battle-by-trial.
Realizing they were hopelessly outmatched by the arrayed
forces of the opposition, the Secured Creditors have sought to
purify their fraud-tainted conduct in the ways possible: 1) by re-
defining fraud and 2) by removing the taint. Because their devilish
reputation has made it difficult to secure a favorable reconstruction
of the Book of Scripture, they have seized upon a giant loophole
in that composite document. It is declared that in certain situ-
ations the Word shall be subordinate to or dependent on the other-
wise profane litany expounded by certain curious law-giving sub-
divisions called States.
As everyone knows, righteousness has never gained hold as
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much among the State oracles as it has on the high Federal level.
The Secured Creditors found that State law-givers could be
persuaded to provide ways by which the taint of fraud could be
banished from their activities. The efforts were not w~holly suc-
cessful, however; it seems, according to the grand high court, that
although some deference is given to State law, it certainly will not
be allowed to upset substantive provisions of the higher law. In
some skirmishes it turned out that the higher law would preclude
any State efforts to aid the Secured Creditors. In others the state
scripture was subjected to interpretations by the federal oracles
adverse to the interests of the Secured Creditors. The road was not
easy and led uphill all the way.
Then came the Nine Articles-a veritable State David to battle
the Federal Goliath. Promoted as the greatest Conciliator of all
time, its proposals swept the state Law-givers and became almost
universal state scripture. At the same time, signaled by these
events, the gladiators of the law review arena took up their pens
and waged mighty wars with ink and paper. Some took the side of
the Secured Creditors and the New Purity; others espoused the
Unsecured Creditors and championed the cause of the old righ-
teousness. The one claimed that the conciliation was complete-
that the new state Code really did not hide fraud at all but
cleansed the transactions of Secured Creditors of its taint. The
other argued stoutly that fraud was fraud by any name and that
the Code's attempts to twist the meaning of the High Scripture
were doomed to failure. Soon all spectators left this arena of paper
spectres to pursue their commercial activities in the new peace,
and the gladiators were left happily displaying their prowess one
to another.
20
III DOGMA
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act which permit a trustee
to set aside a completed transaction between the debtor and other
parties (§§ 60, 67 and 70) seem designed to carry out, in con-
junction with the rest of the Act, three purposes or functions:
1) The nullification of fraudulent transactions by which the
debtor's estate has been depleted to the disadvantage of
(other) creditors;
20 See supra notes 1, 2, 8, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 14, 15, 16.
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2) The avoidance of the efforts of creditors to obtain prefer-
ence over other creditors by securing payment from the
debtor or secured interests in his property during the lat-
ter's insolvency preceding bankruptcy;
3) The equalization of the recovery of creditors from the
debtor's bankrupt estate vhen it is inadequate to pay all
their claims in full.
Only a few critics of the Act voice any argument against the
achievement of any of these goals. 21 They do, however, argue
strenuously over whether certain types of secured transactions
should be held "fraudulent" or "preferential" and thus voidable
by the trustee in bankruptcy under appropriate provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act. Many of these transactions are financing arrange-
ments, such as the "floating lien" varieties, that are commonly used
in the more sophisticated lines of commerce by lenders who do
not wish to loan money or advance credit unless they can gain a
security interest in the borrower's property that is protected from
successful attack by his other creditors, including any trustee in
bankruptcy that should come into the picture in the future.
The protagonists in the fights over the status in bankruptcy
proceedings of these types of transactions are of course the
Secured Creditors, who argue that the security interest is good
against the trustee, and the Unsecured Creditors, who argue that
it should be invalidated. It is worth remembering that the bottom-
ing reason for these arguments, and the court cases in which they
culminate, is the curious way in which the Founders of Bank-
ruptcy translated into terms of specific rights the third goal stated
above: "the equalization of the recovery of creditors from the
debtor's bankrupt estate when it is inadequate to pay all their
claims in full." We know that in bankruptcy "equality is equity"
(and perhaps also "equity is equality") 2 and that therefore, some
classes of creditors are better than others, i.e., some claims are paid
in toto before others receive one penny. Notwithstanding this
semantic contretemps, we also know that there are good and
sufficient reasons for the policy and rule of preferring secured
21 But see note 38 infra.
22 For use of this catchy phrase as a foil for minor skirmishes in the law
review arena, see Henson, 'Proceeds Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65
CoL. L. Rxv. 232, 252 (1965); Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39
MnN. L. R1Ev. 697 (1955).
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creditors to priority creditors to unsecured creditors in divvying
up the property in the bankrupt's estate.
The recognition of security interests in bankruptcy and else-
where encourages credit, which stimulates enterprise, which is the
backbone of the economy, which makes us a strong nation, and
so on, and which may conceivably also have the result of per-
mitting or encouraging the borrower to over-extend himself right
into bankruptcy court. (Of course, the Bankruptcy Act protects
against this last kind of result.)23 Among secured creditors, equality
is naturally not the rule. In the competitiveness of capitalism, the
race to specific property belongs to the creditor who has already
proved his swiftness by first perfecting a security interest in it
according to the canons of state law.
The recognition of priority claims acknowledges that some
unsecured creditors render vital services to the bankrupt, without
which he (and perhaps they) could not live. Thus the landlord,
the employee, the local government, the state government, and
the federal government-and the officials and attorneys who run
the bankruptcy proceeding-have the second opportunity, after
the secured creditors. (It is obvious that they should not get the
first opportunity, since that would tend to force out the secured
creditors, to whom, unlike the bankrupt, the priority claimants
have not rendered vital services.) Among priority creditors equal-
ity is certainly not the rule. Although all priority creditors are
better than all ordinary unsecured creditors, some priority credi-
tors, such as bankruptcy administrators, are inherently better than
other priority creditors.2
The last-place unsecured creditors, on the other hand, enjoy
the fullest equality in the satisfaction of their claims from the
bankrupt's estate. It is hardly necessary for the Bankruptcy Act to
provide for this outcome because, as in the instances of other
references of the word "equality," the only place it is sure to be
found is where there is nothing of significance likely to be shared.
23 "Need cash to pay those bills? Then see Honest John, your friendly loan
broker." Is Honest John inviting his potential customers who are in financial dis-
tress to defraud their creditors? Will Honest John be entitled to whatever
security he takes for the loans as against the borrower's trustee in bankruptcy?
Corker, Hazards of Doing Business with an Insolvent, 1 STAN. L. REv. 189 (1949).
CoUNTrtM AN, CASEs ON DEBTOR AND CREDrroR 523 (1964). Cf. text at note
117 infra.
24 See Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1966).
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Thus, in order to do equity for this creditor and to do equity
for that creditor, the maxim "equality for all creditors" is venti-
lated with many exceptions and qualifications. Even the simple
order of secured creditors first, priority creditors second, and un-
secured creditors last is not firmament. Some secured interests,
such as tax liens, are relegated by the Bankruptcy Act to the
status of priority claims.25 The line between a statutory "lien" and
a statutory "priority" is very malleable. And, of course, some
priority creditors, like wage earners and landlords, find that if
they claim too much, the excess is entered as a plain unsecured
claim.2 6 Greed is not looked upon with favor.
In reality, bankruptcy distribution is the fulfillment of a
complicated hierarchy of precedence and priority. A creditor is
not as much concerned with the number of creditors with whom
he will have to share liquidation proceeds ratably, as he is with
inserting himself as far up the scale as possible. To be a first-in-
line secured creditor is the quintessence of bankruptcy insurance;
to be a general unsecured creditor is tantamount to total loss in
bankruptcy court.2 7 The election cannot occur, however, on the
eve of bankruptcy, or the Act will unhinge the transaction. Nor
can it be tainted with conduct fraudulent under the Act. As a
result it is imperative when he becomes a creditor to obtain a
perfected security interest which will survive in bankruptcy. We
return to the battle of the Secured versus the Unsecured Creditors.
IV. REALITY
Some types of transactions seem actually to be fraudulent, dif-
ficult as it may be to identify the tracks of fraud in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Section 67 (d) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, modeled
upon the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, voids trans-
actions motivated by an actual intent to defraud creditors or,
easier to prove, transactions for less than fair consideration which
result in insolvency or near-insolvency for the debtor-transferor.
2 8
25 Bankruptcy Act § 67, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1952). See note 143 infra.
26 Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (2), (5), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2), (5) (1956).
27 See note 114 infra.
28 This section was added to the Bankruptcy Act by the Chandler Act of
1938. For the reasons why it was thought desirable to make a uniform state law,
then enacted in 16 states, a part of the national Bankruptcy Act, see House
Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. 207-08 (1937).
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Section 67 (d) (3), codifying Dean v. Davis,2 9 strikes at transactions
made by insolvent-debtors contemplating liquidation and in-
tending to prefer a certain creditor or creditors, provided that the
other party to the transaction knows the debtor intends a pre-
ference.30 These are neither the transactions nor the Bankruptcy
Act provisions over which there is all the shooting; therefore, we
can put them aside.31
The Bankruptcy Act also vitiates all transfers which are avoid-
able, for fraud or other reasons, under non-bankruptcy law, "by
any creditor of the debtor, having a claim provable under this
Act.' 32 The Act in this way accommodates state enactments of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act and equivalent legislation,
thereby accomplishing nearly the same purposes as § 67 (d) (2).
Again, there is no dispute over the correctness or justice of such
avoiding power.
On the other hand, we can observe in the hallowed Moore v.
Bay33 the effect of § 70 (e) where the applicable state law does not
invalidate out-and-out fraud but merely holds that a security
interest will not prevail against an ordinary unsecured creditor
extending credit to the transferor between the time the security
interest arises and its perfection by filing. The transfer is "deem-
ed" to be fraudulent as to such intervening creditors-regardless
of the commercial reasonableness of the delay or the absence of
actual fraud, express or implicit. This is the fraud of the "secret
lien," and this is where the secured creditor begins to hold the
opinion that the righteousness of the bankruptcy courts runneth
over and that surely the meek, unsecured creditors inherit more
of the earth than they deserve. In states which have made any
security arrangement vulnerable to creditors intervening before
perfection by filing, situations like the following are said to have
arisen in order to maximize the security of the secured creditor:
Dozens of corporate officers of the borrower, lenders and
bond indenture trustees and their counsel were assembled in
e9 242 U.S. 488 (1917).30 This provision also was inserted in the Bankruptcy Act in 1938. It was
amended in 1952 to better conform to the law of Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438
(1917). See H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
31 For a recitation of cases arising under § 67 (d) (3), see Hahn, Voidable
Secured Loans to an Insolvent Debtor, 71 Cou. L.J. 219 (1966).32 Bankruptcy Act § 70(e), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1952).
33 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
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a New York hotel on a Sunday night in the fall of 1954 to
close a large deal involving real estate and chattel accessories
in many states. They were marshalled at midnight to execute
documents at 12:01 A.M., so the documents could be flown by
special messenger to recording officers over the United States
the same day.
34
Constance v. Harvey35 was the high-water mark of the vulner-
ability of apparently secured transactions to defeat in bankruptcy
court. It gave the trustee under § 70 (c) the status of a hypothetical
intervening creditor whereas § 70 (c) accords only the standing of
an actual intervening creditor existing at the date of bankruptcy.
The decision was a major victory for unsecured creditors in their
continuing cold war against secured creditors. The cure for the
latter's lame position lay in two directions: first, to obtain the
reinterpretation of § 70 (c) which was accomplished in Lewis v.
Manufacturers National Bank,36 in which the Supreme Court
limited the trustee's standing to that of a hypothetical judicial
lien creditor as of the date of bankruptcy; and, secondly, change
state law under § 70 (e) to permit a reasonable time for perfecting
a secured interest by a filing which would relate back to the date
the security agreement was executed and the security interest
attached. This has been accomplished, it is thought, by the
U.C.C., as we shall see shortly.
However, under § 70 (e) there has been another, greater cause
for distress among the ranks of secured creditors. Not only have
they protested the aggrandizement of "secret lien" fraud in bank-
ruptcy court, but they have been indignant over the Supreme
Court's holy decree in Moore v. Bay that § 70 (e) permits the set-
ting aside of an entire security interest, no matter how large, if
there existed an intervening creditor having a claim no matter
how small. The spectre of an intervening $10 creditor upsetting a
$100,000 secured creditor-a magnification of the "deemed" fraud
10,000 times as a result of the "equity" construction of the re-
medial power under § 70 (e)-has been brought to life in several
cases.37
3 4 
MAcLACHLAN, BAuxiuurTcy 834 (1956).
35215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
36364 U.S. 603 (1961).
37 $10 creditor upset $2,300 mortgage, In re Flonta, 311 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.
1962); $8,900 creditor upset $82,500 mortgage, Miller v. Sulmeyer, 263 F.2d 513
(Continued on next page)
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The Moore decision, unlike Constance, has never been over-
turned by the Supreme Court or congressional amendment of
the Bankruptcy Act.38 To avoid its impact the drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code have taken advantage of the Great
Loophole-that the Bankruptcy Act defers to state law in some
situations by doing away with the avoiding power of "gap" credi-
tors under state law. First, the Code states that "a security agree-
ment is effective . . . against creditors"39 except lien creditors
(including the bankruptcy trustee), creditors who perfect a secu-
rity interest in the same collateral, and the transferees of in-
tangibles without notice and for value.40 Perfection of the security
interest removes the exceptions. Second, when perfection can be
achieved only by notice-filing, the Code permits filing before
giving value under a security interest, so that at the time value is
given the security interest automatically becomes perfected.
41
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838 (1959); $4.64 creditor upset $1,678
mortgagee, Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kahn, 203 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1953); "One
small creditor" upset $65,000 mortgagee, Zamore v. Goldblatt, 194 F.2d 933 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952). Cou ThYMAN, CASES ON DEBTOR
AND CREDrroR 505-06 (1964). This was the spectre that haunted the midnight
financiers, according to Profes5dr MacLachlan. See note 23 supra. "Only Moore v.
Bay would suggest such an extravagant interference with the routine of high
priced men.... There is reason to believe that the economic cost of fighting the
spectres conjured up by Moore v. Bay greatly exceeds the total collections under
section 70(e)." MACLACHLAN, BANimurTcY 334 (1956).
38 In spite of such sharp criticism as the late Professor Hanna (half of the
Hanna and MacLachlan Bankruptcy Act) has delivered:
The rule of Moore v. Bay as now applied to cases under Section
70(c) and (e) is an instance of confiscation of security. Here was a case
not properly presented to the Supreme Court, where the Court seemed
confused on the facts, made no clear definition of the issues, and gave
a Delphic decision. The real issue, upon which the circuits, contrary to
what the Court said, were divided, was whether all creditors should share
in what was recovered by the trustee when his recovery was based on
rights of particular creditors. No one questions that the Court's decision
that all creditors should share, is correct. If the Court actually meant to
hold that the mortgage in question was void entirely it was wrong both
as to state and bankruptcy law. The fantastic notion that because under
applicable law, usually state law, some creditor has a particular advantage
against a security, the security is totally void, has no sound basis in the
law of fraudulent conveyances, security, bankruptcy, nor in common
sense and justice. So strong is the influence of representatives of un-
secured creditors that it is doubtful if a bare majority of the National
Bankruptcy Conference is now in favor of reversing Moore v. Bay. See
Schwartz, Moore v. Bay-Should Its Rule be Repealed, 60 Com. L.J. 67
(1955); 29 REF. J. 67 (1955). In some quarters a proposal to abolish all
security in bankruptcy would have strong support. HANNA, CAsES ON
SEcunrry 11 (3d ed. 1959).
39 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-201.
40 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-301.
41 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-303(1).
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Third, the party holding a purchase money security interest also
has ten days after the buyer gains possession of the collateral to
perfect his interest by filing; an intervening lien creditor does not
outrank him.42 In this way the applicability of § 70 (e) and Moore
v. Bay is reduced to transfers covered by extra-Code law provisions,
such as state fraudulent conveyances laws.
43
The consequences of failure (or inability) to achieve timely
perfection and thus to avoid defeat by intervening creditors have
not been the major obstacles to complete recognition of security
interest in bankruptcy proceedings. The doctrine of the fraudu-
lent taint of the "secret lien" has had a greater impact on security
arrangements which, in spite of conformity with the requirements
of availing state law, have been reduced by the bankruptcy courts
to the status of unsecured transactions. In some situations the
trouble has come because the state law itself did not provide
adequate protection against the powers wielded by the bankruptcy
trustee standing in the shoes of a lien creditor under §§ 70 (c) and
(e), as noted in the preceding part of this article. In other situa-
tions the bankruptcy courts, by their interpretation of state law,
especially as it may be overridden by federal bankruptcy law,
have thrown out security devices as fraudulent or preferential
under the Bankruptcy Act.
The Uniform Commercial Code, as the Great Conciliator of
the interests of the Secured Creditors and the Unsecured Credi-
tors, has sought to destroy the "secret lien" and its upsetting im-
pact as a fraud on the bankruptcy court. For the benefit of the
Unsecured Creditors, it has established a system for perfecting
security interests against subsequent creditors (and the trustee)
42 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-301(2). The ten day "relation-back" is
protected under § 60(a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Act.
43The provisions of the Code:
deal a shattering blow to the doctrine of Moore v. Bay, because they
appear to make it impossible for a simple creditor to prevail over an
unperfected security interest. It has been observed that typically Moore
v. Bay has operated in situations under which state law gives the
simple creditor priority over an unperfected security holder, even though
the latter subsequently perfects his interest. This law is now changed by
the Commercial Code, and Moore v. Bay is largely swept away in its
wake.
This is not to say that Moore v. Bay is completely dead. There are a
few marginal situations in which the doctrine might still operate. Hawk-
land, The Impact of the Commercial Code on the Doctrine of Moore v.
Bay, 67 Com. L.J. 359, 361-62 (1962).
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that is fairly rigorous in its requirements of public notice. In
general, in order for an interest to be perfected, the secured party
must possess the collateral (as in the case of negotiable instru-
ments) or make timely filing of a financing statement evidencing
the security interest. For the Secured Creditor the filing require-
ments have been streamlined, simplified, unified, and clarified.
44
In this way (it is thought that) righteousness has been made to
prevail, at least where it is commercially justified.
The Grand Conciliation may not be without its pitfalls, how-
ever. It is one thing to remove the taint of fraud by adopting a
thorough system of filing to publicize non-possessory security
interests. It is another thing to proclaim flatly that certain com-
mercial conduct held by the bankruptcy courts to be fatally
"fraudulent" or "preferential" is no longer fraudulent or pre-
ferential. Let us examine two cases which especially anguished
Secured Creditors, the commercial situations from which they
arose, and the Code attempts to set the law aright.
First, Benedict v. Ratner45 and "debtor dominion." One can-
not be sure exactly what the Supreme Court found wrong with
the security arrangement in Benedict. The creditor had obtained
agreement for a security interest in accounts receivable without.
taking possession of them or making any public filing or other
third-party notice evidencing his security interest; furthermore,
he had permitted the debtor to collect the accounts and to keep
the proceeds in his business without regular accounting to his
lendor, subject to demand for an accounting or for payment at
any time. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, certainly
found a taint of fraud. He grounded the decision by holding the
transaction to be a fraudulent conveyance under state law. It is
not clear whether conformity with any extant state law permitting
perfection by public filing would have saved the security interest.
At any rate, creditor Ratner was not able to obtain proceeds col-
lected by the bankrupt that had passed into the hands of the
trustee.40
The Code attempts expressly to cure the defect in state law
44But there are hidden traps, which are sprung in bankruptcy court. See
Hiller, note 10 supra.
45 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
46 Cases succeeding Benedict compounded the confusion and bemused the
law review gladiators. See note 1 supra.
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(which had previously been removed in some states after Benedict,
with regard to some kinds of "dominion" transactions):
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against
creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use, com-
mingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral (including
returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or compromise
accounts, contract rights or chattel paper, or to accept the
return of goods or make repossessions, or to use, commingle
or dispose of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the
secured party to require the debtor to account for proceeds
or replace collateral. This section does not relax the require-
ments of possession where perfection of a security interest
depends upon possession of the collateral by the secured
party or by a bailee.
47
It is easy to see the Great Conciliator at work here: not only
are public notice requirements made applicable to this type of
transaction (removing the fraud), but care seems to be taken to
wipe away any suspicion of hanky-panky which might linger on
from some of Justice Brandeis's dicta in the Benedict opinion.
Second, Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klaud-
er4s and the "floating lien." The holding of the Supreme Court
of the United States in this case added an element to the legal
context that did not exist in the Benedict case. In Klauder the
petitioning creditors were able to show that they had followed a
widely used commercial practice.49 Nevertheless, the Court, by
the words of Justice Jackson, found that the arrangement violated
47 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-205.
This Section .... repeals the nile of Benedict v. Ratner ... and other
cases which held such arrangements void as a matter of law because the
debtor was given unfettered dominion or control over the collateral....
While this Section replaces Benedict in matters of form, the filing require-
ments (Section 9-302) give other creditors the opportunity to ascertain
from public sources whether property of their debtor or prospective
debtor is subject to secured claims, and to provisions about proceeds
(Section 9-306(4) enable creditors to claim collections which were
made by the debtor more than 10 days before insolvency proceedings
and commingled or deposited in a bank account before institution of the
insolvency proceedings. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-205, Comments
1 and 3.
48318 U.S. 434 (1943).
49 Petitioners cite and rely upon Saulnier and Jacoby, Accounts Receiv-
able Financing (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943), for an
estimate that in 1941 commercial finance companies advanced $536,000,-
000 on this basis; and commercial banks, $952,000,000. Of the borrowers,
it was estimated that 63% had total (not net) assets less than $200,-
000; and 31%, less than $50,000. Their borrowing was estimated, how-
ever, to amount to less than 19% of the total. Id. at 17, 32, 64. 318
U.S. 434, 438 (1943).
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the letter of § 60 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act and the policy of
Congress against recognizing "secret liens."
It seems that older creditors of the bankrupt company had
agreed to subordinate their claims to the petitioners, who were
willing to provide fresh working capital in return for assignment
of accounts receivable. At the time, the law of Pennsylvania,
where these events occurred, provided that the interest of the
assignee of accounts receivable first to notify the account debtors
would prevail.50 The new creditors did not notify the account
debtors-presumably to hide the fact that the company had been
forced to hypothecate one of its most liquid assets. When the
company folded in bankruptcy, the new creditors sought the bene-
fit of their collateral-and lost.
The Supreme Court, in a spirit of regretful sternness, said to
the new creditors that it was sorry about what it had to do, but
the law is the law, and § 60 (a) says that a transfer for an antece-
dent debt is voidable by the trustee as a preference (provided the
other requirements of § 60 are met). And, to get to the crux of
the opinion, the assignment of the accounts receivable, though
contemporaneous with the giving of value by the lendor, was not
effective as a "transfer" under § 60 until at least the debtor had
notified the account debtors. Why? Because in the wisdom of the
Chandler Act revisers, a transfer does not occur until it becomes
"so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor
and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the
property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee
therein." A B.F.P. or creditor, i.e., a subsequent assignee of the
account, clearly could prevail over the "secret lien" of the
petitioning creditors if he notified the account debtors first. Con-
gress wished to stamp out "secret liens" regardless of their com-
merical acceptability, and that policy as incorporated into § 60 (a),
required a decision against the petitioning creditors.
One can be sure that this decision raised a great flurry in com-
mercial acceptability, and that policy as incorporated into § 60 (a),
cudgels in a series of campaigns that culminated in the adoption
by Congress in 1950 of the present § 60 (a), which replaces the
bona-fide purchaser standard with a lien creditor test.51
50 The civilized "English rule" for perfecting interests in assigned accounts.
5 1 Professor Countryman has reported in glorious detail the aftermath of
Klauder. Countryman, note 4 supra.
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However, neither the correction of state law in the Benedict de-
cision nor the change of the Klauder outcome by amendment of
the Bankruptcy Act was broad enough to cover one important
folkway in modem commercial financing. Curing the legal defects
in a security interest which allows the secured party's lien to float
over much of the debtor's property, over which he has control,
takes care only of static arrangements. It does not deal with the
same arrangements through time. As the debtor sells, liquidates,
or replaces some of the floating collateral, the secured creditor de-
mands both that his security interest shall attach to the new pro-
perty and that the transfer shall be perfected automatically. Thus,
the creditor is relieved of the economic nuisance of creating a new
transaction by which he gives new value for the new security.
Unfortunately, § 60 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, even after the
1950 amendment, avoids transfers of property interests made with-
in four months of bankruptcy which preferentially benefit an
antecedent creditor.
In face of these conditions, the draftsmen of the Code boldly
stated that as a matter of (state) law:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an
obligation, releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise
gives new value which is to be secured in whole or in part
by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value
and not as security for an antecedent debt if the debtor ac-
quires his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary
course of his business or under a contract of purchase made
pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time
after new value is given. (Emphasis added.)
52
It is clear that this is not the kind of change which the drafts-
men undertook in Code § 9-205 to reverse the Benedict decision.
That decision purported to rest on state law, and the Code merely
changes state law. In the after-acquired property situation, on the
other hand, the draftsmen are trying to put the shoe on the other
foot by adopting an old trick of the High Priests of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Whereas formerly the Holy Men "deemed" certain
security arrangements of creditors to be fraudulent and thus void
as against the trustee in bankruptcy, the draftsmen in effect are
O2 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-108.
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saying that certain transactions shall not be "deemed" fraudulent
(that is, "preferential," in the language of § 60 (a)), i.e., shall not
be construed as transfers for antecedent debts, which § 60 (a)
makes preferential.
Should the draftsmen of the Code and the creditors operating
under it get away with turning the tables? From the conceptual
point of view, it appears the argument can go either way, as is
usually the case with conceptual points of view, especially after
they have been bruited and bruised in the law review arena. Mr.
Bernard Reimer strikes the blows for the Unsecured Creditors and
against Code § 9-108 in dealing with the situation where the after-
acquired property comes into the debtor's possession within four
months prior to the date of his bankruptcy:
It is assumed that the transfer in issue was made in a
state which had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code and
at a time when the Code was in effect. We therefore look
to the Code to determine when, under its provisions, a secu-
rity interest in after-acquired inventory becomes so far per-
fected that no subsequent lien creditor can obtain rights in
such property superior to those of the secured party.
Section 9-204(1) of the Code provides:
"A security interest cannot attach until there is agree-
ment (subsection (8) of Section 1-201) that it attach and
value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral. It
attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence
have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the
time of attaching."
Section 9-303(1) of the Code provides:
"A security interest is perfected when it has attached and
when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have
been taken. Such steps are specified in sections 9-302, 9-304,
9-305, and 9-306. If such steps are taken before the security
interest attaches, it is perfected at the time when it attaches."
The last sentence of this section is further explained in the
Comment to the Code as follows:
"If the steps for perfection have been taken in advance
(as when the secured party files a financing statement before
giving value or before the debtor acquires rights in the col-
lateral), then the interest is perfected automatically when it
attaches."
Under the Code, the creditors security interest in after-
acquired collateral can be perfected no earlier than the time
(Vol. 55,
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when the debtor obtains rights in such collateral. Obviously,
a secured party cannot perfect a security interest in his
debtor's goods before the debtor has himself acquired such
goods or rights in them. This is made clear in Comment 4 to
section 9-204 which states:
"A security agreement may be executed and value given
before the debtor acquires rights: the security interest will
then attach under subsection (1), as to after-acquired pro-
perty, when he does"
Application of the foregoing principles to the postulated
facts leads to the conclusion that the transfer, which consisted
of the creation of a security interest in after-acquired col-
lateral, was perfected (under the Code) at the time when the
debtor acquired such collateral, and was therefore made
(under section 60(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act) at such
time, which was within the period of four months before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition 3
Mr. Harold Friedman, relying on a clutch of cases under pre-
Code statutory law, urges that § 9-108 is unnecessary to validate a
security interest in after-acquired property and, for good mea-
sure, adds that the legislative history of § 60 is not repugnant to
recognition of that provision of the Code:
If the Roche and Comet cases mean anything, they mean
that there can be inventory and accounts receivable finan-
cing free from attacks of the trustee in bankruptcy under
a financing device that is, for purposes of discussion here,
similar to that of article 9 of the Code. Since the New York
and New Hampshire Factors Lien Acts, then, have met with
success in avoiding the preference pitfall, there would seem
to be need for section 9-108. Roche found its rationale in the
fact that there was a continuing res and the lien attached
to the res. Comet did not even demand the construction of a
res. It turned solely upon the fact that the statute had pro-
vided for an automatically perfected lien and that the after-
acquired goods become subject to this continuing lien once
53 Reimer, Bankruptcy-Preference-Conflict Between Section 9-108 of Uni-
form Commercial Code and Section 60(a) of Bankruptcy Act, 70 CoM. L.J. 63,
64-65 (1965) (Author's footnotes omitted). Later in 1965 Mr. Reimer found it
necessary to Revisit the After-Acquired Property Clause because of a late-ap-
pearing decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas, decided under the "Mas-
sachusetts rule." Although he "feels some doubt as to the analytical correctness
of the [Kansas] court's reasoning and conclusion on the preference issue," Mr.
Reimer does note that all but three of the fifty states now adhere to the auto-
matic perfection rule adopted by the Code and not to the Massachusets rule.
Reimer, The After-Acquired Property Clause Revisited, 70 Com . L.J. 334, 338
(1965).
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the original agreement was perfected. This last analysis,
particularly, is essentially no different than the construction
of the chattel mortgage acts represented in the Alabama
Braid, Claussen and Hayes cases; in states with the automatic
perfection rule security interests in after-acquired property
have escaped preference avoidance even in the absence of
specific statutory provision establishing a continuing lien.
It is submitted that a court made cognizant of the nature of
the Code's continuing and floating legal lien-perfected at
the execution and filing of the financing instrument-should
not be able to hold that a preferential transfer has been ef-
fected. To find a preference the court would have to take
authority either from the legislative history of the 1938 and
1960 amendments or from the present language of section
60. Neither, however, appears to support such a construc-
tion.
5 4
Mr. Friedman recommends that § 9-108 be amended to accord
with the conceptualizations of the cases on which he relies, thus
removing a superfluous roadblock in the Secured Creditor's path.55
V. CONFLICT
We come now to In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co.,
Inc.,56 a 1966 bankruptcy case decided by Referee Snedecor on
February 9, 1966, and now before the United States District
Court of Oregon for review.57 The unusual circumstances of the
case do not make an ideal context for a landmark decision setting
down Fairness and Justice in the Land of Creditors, Secured and
Unsecured. Union members in Portland, Oregon, struck the two
54 Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Pro-
perty Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. BEv. 194, 215-16 (1959).
55 Id. at 222-24.
508 UCC REP'. 194 (1966); BANtam. L. REP. IU 61,722 (1966); CCH INsTAL-
mmrT ,CnmDrr GUIDE 11 98,483 (D. Ore. 1966). The "pertinent part of the
opinion" is reproduced in Referee Snedecor Rules that Provisions of Uniform
Commercial Code which Conflict with the Bankruptcy Act are Void Against a
Trustee in Bankruptcy, 40 Br. J. 48 (1966). The case is cited hereinafter as
Portland Newspaper and to pages in the UCC RlP. only.
The law review arena has not been silent. The case is discussed in King, note
13 supra; Levit, Oregon Referee in Bankruptcy Holds Uniform Commercial Code
in Conflict with Bankruptcy Act, 71 Com. L.J. 139 (1966); Note. 8 B.C. In. &
Com. L. 1Ev. 101 (1966); Note, 44 TExAs L. Rxv. 1369 (1966).
57 The case was scheduled for hearing on Jan. 26, 1967. 4 CCH INsmaL?-nNT
C~arr GUIDE, Rep. Letter No. 136, at 3 (Jan. 17, 1967). The National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws earlier was permitted to file a
brief as a friend of the court. 4 CCH INSTALLMENT Cmmrr GUIDE, Rep. Letter
No. 123, at 4 (July 19, 1966).
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daily papers, which then combined forces to publish a single paper
during the strike. Several unions joined together to publish their
own daily Reporter for the under-journalized Portlanders. A
corporation was formed and stock sold to the public. The unions
provided plant and equipment to the corporation at cost.
Whatever its journalistic success, the Reporter did not prosper
financially. Crises were averted by cash contributions from labor
unions and from "public spirited citizens"; the presses continued
to run for four years. Finally, in the face of falling circulation, in-
adequate advertising revenue, and mounting deficits, the directors
of the newspaper decided to stop operations and wind-up the
corporation. Shortly thereafter, wage claimants forced it into
involuntary bankruptcy. The trustee liquidated the bankrupt's
assets to form a fund of 121,000 dollars, of which 107,000 dollars
came from the collection of accounts receivable. Priority claims
totaled 54,000 dollars (43,000 for wages and 11,000 for taxes),
while other unsecured claims amounted to about 80,000 dollars.
In addition, six creditors entered claims amounting to 122,000
dollars, plus interest, which they asserted were secured by ac-
counts receivable58
Referee Snedecor had little difficulty in disposing of two of the
six purportedly secured claims. Oregon's adoption of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, effective September 1, 1963, aided his
task; the would-be secured creditors had fumbled the transition,
and the old law coated their transactions in the grease of fraud.r9
However, the claim of Rose City Development Co., Inc. (herein-
after referred to as Rose City), a corporation formed by eighty-
eight local unions to acquire and lease premises to the Reporter,
raised squarely the loudly-trumpeted conflict between the floating-
lien, debtor-dominion leniency of Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the hard language of § 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 60 At last the battles of the law review arena were
duplicated in the flesh: in Portland, Oregon, a large and diverse
assortment of creditors, whose claims totaled 256,000 dollars, were
fighting over a bankrupt's estate of 107,000 dollars, and if the pot
58 The facts are stated in Portland Newspaper 196-200.
59Id. at 200-09.
ro The remaining three claims asserting security interests in the bankrupt's
accounts receivable were by agreement subordinate to the claim of Rose City. Id.
at 200.
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were to be distributed, the respective language and purposes of
Code § 9-108 and Bankruptcy Act § 60 had to be reconciled.
Pursuant to a security agreement with the bankrupt, Rose
City filed a financing statment on November 26, 1963.61 The
agreement, which used a standard Code form, asserted as col-
lateral "all accounts receivable of the debtor now existing or
hereafter arising." The policing requirements stated on the form-
deposit of the proceeds from the accounts receivables in a cash
collateral account in the secured party's name-were crossed out.
The borrowing percentage was fixed at seventy-five per cent of
the value of the collateral, and repayment was scheduled at
$653.36 monthly. That was all.62 There is no record that Rose
City ever exercised any control over its shifting collateral or, ap-
parently, knew at any time what, how much, or what quality it
was until less than a month before bankruptcy.63 On September
29, 1964, Rose City and two of the other security claimants de-
manded in writing that their collateral accounts be collected and
held in trust for them.6
According to the trustee, "substantially all" of the accounts re-
ceivable outstanding on the date of bankruptcy arose within four
months before the bankruptcy petition was filed on October 15,
1964.65 The referee concluded that the bankrupt was insolvent
throughout the four months. 66 Thus, the stage for the conflict
between Code and Act was set; the facts were on all fours with
any case that might be constructed for a paper and pen battle.
In his opinion, Referee Snedecor displays the diligence of a
true apostle of righteousness. Recounting many of the battles of
the law review arena, he discusses in some detail the thrusts and
parries of seven of the gladiators.67 He even rules clearly in favor
of some gladiators over others and incorporates the works of the
61 Id. at 209.
62 Id. at 210.
63 Id. at 210. The two creditors whose asserted security interests were re-
jected on the basis of Oregon law alone had made minimal attempts to identify
their collateral. Id. at 201, 206.
64 Id. at 199. The stated date of "February 29, 1964," in line 4 is apparently
erroneous; cf. id. at 210.
65 Id. at 210.
66 Id. at 224. The referee also concluded that "The claimants either knew or
had reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt was insolvent during said
period," thus satisfying the additional requirement of § 60(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act for setting aside a preferential transfer. Ibid.
67 Id. at 214-28.
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winners into the justification for his decision against Rose City as
a secured creditor in the distribution of the bankrupt's assets.6
Notwithstanding the referee's Solomon-like judgment of the gladi-
ators, did he reach the right result in the actual controversy be-
fore him? It is submitted that his decision is correct on the law;69
that Righteousness and Justice could not support a contrary out-
come; 70 and that a thorough reading of his perceptive opinion re-
veals he came to the right conclusion on full consideration of the
policies of the Bankruptcy Act.
7 1
Three distinctive goals have been suggested as the policy be-
hind the trustee's powers over the bankrupt's property and trans-
actions: nullification of fraud, avoidance of preference, and equity
of distribution.7 2 The retroactivity of the nullification of fraudu-
lent transactions and transfers extends for fraudulent transfers
to four months before the bankruptcy petition was filed 73 or one
year before the same date74 or, further, if the state law of fraudu-
lent transfers and the existence of a defrauded creditor permit.7 5
The trustee may avoid preferential transfers made up to four
months before the date of bankruptcy.76 Over other transfers of
interests in the debtor's property, he has the status of a lien credi-
tor under non-bankruptcy law.77
6 8 The court has had the benefit of extensive briefs and many excellent
articles on this important problem now awaiting a judicial solution. The
wide divergence of opinion gives one pause as to the correct solution.
We have been impressed by the line of reasoning in the articles by Ken-
nedy and Riemer ... and by Nahum Gordon, Chap 11 Coogan, Hogan
& Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the UCC. These writers appear to
have considered the problem more in the light of the policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Act than have some of the apologists for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. In order that this opinion may not be unduly extended,
the above three articles are cited in support of the supremacy of the
bankruptcy law over state law in determining the existence of a voidable
preference. Id. at 223.
69 Cf. Note, 44 TzxAs L. REv. 1369 (1966). "Section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act was never intended to invalidate the floating lien recognized by section 9-108
of the UCC." Id. at 1377.
10 Cf. Note, 8 B.C. IND. & Conr. L. tREv. 10 (1966). "[T]he result in Port-
land Newspaper perhaps sacrifices Code objectives for the sake of form .... Id.
at 110.
71 Cf. Note, 44 TExAs L. REv. 1369 (1966). "[n terms of policy the
instant decision is unwise.... Such a result is blatantly contrary to the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act .. " Id. at 1377.
72 See text at note 21 supra.
7 3 Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (3) (1952).
74 Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1952).7GBankruptcy Act § 7 0(e), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1952).76 Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1) (1950).7 Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952). Other transfers, out-
(Continued on next page)
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The bankruptcy referee and trustee do not, therefore, have a
roving commission to range through the chronicle of the bank-
rupt's past, overriding this transaction and approving that one.
Although the Bankruptcy Act has a constitutionally-based suprem-
acy over state law,78 the Act itself expressly defers to state law in
many instances.70 Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts, in-
cluding bankruptcy courts, must rely upon state construction and
interpretation.
The factual perimeters of the Portland Newspaper case limit
our inquiry in four ways. First, the case does not involve fraudu-
lent conduct, i.e., the transactions in it do not come within the
Bankruptcy Act's nullification of transactions motivated by fraud-
ulent intention or amounting constructively to fraudulent trans-
fers of the debtor's property. Second, only transactions secured
under Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code are in-
volved. There are other kinds of transactions, such as consignment
sales and "cash" sales, which raise problems of the proper relation-
ship between the Bankruptcy Act and the Code.s0
Third, the particular transaction at issue, Rose City's security
interest in the bankrupt's accounts receivables, was properly per-
fected under Code requirements. Section 9-301 of the Code states
by negative inference that a perfected scurity interest is superior
to a subsequent lien creditor's interest, and "lien creditor" is de-
fined expressly to include the bankruptcy trustee. Hence § 70 (c)
of the Bankruptcy Act, which limits the trustee's standing as a
lien creditor to a lien creditor "upon the date of bankruptcy,"
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
side the topic of this monograph, are also void or voidable. Liens obtained against
a person by legal or equitable processes within four months prior to the initiation
of bankruptcy proceedings are void if, at the time, the person was insolvent or
the lien was obtained in fraud of the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act § 67(a),
11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1952). For the importance of this provision in effecting
Bankruptcy Act policy, see Wolfe, The Correlation of Liens and Priorities, 27
TmrP. L.Q. 268-70 (1953). Statutory liens which are not effective until the
debtor's insolvency or have not become effective until the debtor's insolvency or
have not achieved, before the date of bankruptcy, a prescribed degree of perfection
or enforcement are invalid against the trustee. Bankruptcy Act § 67(c), 11 U.S.C.
§ 107(c) (1952). See note 143 infra.
78 Congress is empowered "to establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
79 But see note 140 infra.
80 See Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
40 REF. J. 37 (1966), and the material cited therein. Professor Shanker also dis-
cusses the jousting in the law review arena over § 2-702 of the Code and a sellers
right to reclaim in bankruptcy court goods sold to an insolvent debtor before his
bankruptcy.
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prevents the trustee from prevailing generally over the previously
perfected security interest.8' The Code has minimized the bank-
ruptcy referee's task of determining who, including the bank-
ruptcy trustee, can under state law attack a security interest per-
fected under state law. The Code not only clarifies the require-
ments for perfection, but also specifies against whom the per-
fection is good. Where the party asserting a security interest has
not met the perfection requirements of the Code, the outcome is
easily reached without any conflict between the Code and the
Bankruptcy Act.
2
Fourth, the transactions are debts incurred by the bankrupt
and secured (by the parties' intentions), in part, by property
acquired by the bankrupt after the debt was incurred. That the
property was intangible accounts receivable and not tangible in-
ventory is not significant here.83 There is perhaps a momentary
temptation to conclude, after a hasty reading of such holy cases
as Benedict s4 and Klauder,85 that the bankruptcy trustee does have
a roving commission to upset any secured interests in after-
acquired property, especially after-acquired property over which
the creditor has permitted the debtor absolute or nearly absolute
dominion. As this article has already emphasized, such is no longer
the truth-even the debatable truth-because the Code has suc-
cessfully removed the taint of fraud from, and cast the glow of
legitimacy on, both the practice of allowing debtor dominion over
collateral 6 and the argument that after-acquired property should
rank, for priority purposes, from the date the security interest was
originally perfected, not from the date the debtor acquired it.87
"Successfully" is a word that in this context requires some
clarification. The Code may not be a success by standards of in-
ternal consistency and coherence, as the law review gladiators have
extensively disputed, but it is a success in establishing state law
to which decision-makers in bankruptcy must defer, -both for the
letter of the statutory sections and for the reconciliation of their
82 See Referee Snedecor's discussion of the claim of Robert J. Davis, who,
like Rose City, had asserted a security interest in the bankrupt's accounts re-
ceivable. The referee found the claim fatally defective under the Code. Portland
Newspaper, at 205-09.
83 Cf. text at note 115 infra.84 See text at notes 102-04 supra.
85 See text at notes 105-08 supra.
8 6 UNrFoRm Comu!mcIAL CODE § 9-205.
8 7
UNIoRn CoI j3mcrAL CODE § 9-108.
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differences. In his opinion in Portland Newspaper, Referee Snede-
cor appropriately notes that the much-publicized bankruptcy case
of In re Newkirk Mining Co.88 did not present a conflict between
the Bankruptcy Act and the Code because, although it involved a
Code security interest in after-acquired property, the entire trans-
action occurred outside the limits of the power of avoidance of
the bankruptcy trustee and within the dominion of state law.89
In Portland Newspaper, on the other hand, the transaction
secured under Article Nine, or at least part of it, did occur within
the scope of the trustee's power to carry out the Bankruptcy Act's
goal of avoiding preferential transfers. Most of the accounts re-
ceivable which came into the trustee's hands on the date of bank-
ruptcy "arose" 90 within four months prior to the date the petition
was filed. When the accounts arose, a security interest was auto-
matically "transferred" to the creditor, Rose City, under its
security agreement with the bankrupt. The debt secured by the
accounts receivable had come into existence "antecedent" to the
transfer of a security interest in them.91 The bankrupt was in-
solvent throughout the four months prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. In short, the facts seem squarely to fit §
88 54 Bmaps CouNTy L.J. 179, 1 UCC REP'. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
89.Potln Newspaper, at 223. In his opinion in Newkirk Mining, Referee
Biller did not state whether the collateral bad been acquired by the debtor with-
in the four months' insolvency period. Referee Snedecor clarifies the ambiguity
by stating that "the after-acquired equipment claimed by the secured creditor in
that case had been acquired by the debtor sometime before the critical four
month period." Ibid.
9 0 Throughout this passage we are trying to relate by transactional analysis
the language of the Code § 9-108 with the language of the Bankruptcy Act §
60(a) (1).
The 1950 revision of section 60 was in course of drafting during the late
1940's, under the auspices of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
Article 9 was being drafted during the same period. Unfortunately no
effective liaison between the two drafting groups was ever estab-
lished. . . . [T]he redraft of section 60 was accomplished without re-
ference to the Code project .... Why then, was Article 9 not redrafted
after 1950 ...to mesh with section 60 or . . . to minimize the prob-
lems.. .? [S]uch a redraft of Article 9 would have difficulty to the point
of impossibility. 2 GrLmoRE, Szcorr IrNrmEsTs XN PEmSONAL PRoPRTY
§ 45.4 at 1303 (1965).
Under Code language we are concerned initially with pinpointing the time when
the debtor first 'has rights in the collateral." UNIFOm CoMMERcxAL CODE §
9-204(1). Whether that event occurs in the instance of accounts receivable when
the accounts "first came into existence," as Referee Snedecor says it, Portland
Newspaper at 210, or when they "arose," as the author puts it, is a nice
semantical question. At any rate, arose is arose is arose.
91From the opinion in Portland Newspaper, it is not precisely clear when
the debt arose or how it was incurred. It seems safe to presume that it came into
existence at least four months prior to the filing of bankruptcy.
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60 (a) (1)'s definition of a preferential transfer,9 2 which the trustee
may avoid under § 60 (b).93 The facts seem equally well to fit
within the scope of § 9-108 of the Code, which states squarely that
"after-acquired property shall be deemed to be taken for new
value and not as security for an antecedent debt."
94
At last reaching the issue in the case, it is tempting to the
decision-maker or commentator to haul down the federal-law-is-
supreme-over-state-law grundnorm, to search through the legisla-
tive history and case precedents for interpreting § 60 (a) (1), and
then to dispose of the case on the answer to the question of
whether "transfer for an antecedent" debt can be construed to
accommodate state law which would relate a transfer back to the
time the debt was incurred and value given95 Such a procedure
confuses the question "How can I get out of this case by matching
it with what the law says?" with the different question "What is
U2 The Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) reads as follows:
[A] transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have
been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that
no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on simple contract could become superior to the rights of
the transferee.
Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) reads:
A preference is a transfer... of any of the property of a debtor to or for
the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made
or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before
the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under
this Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the
same class.
The rest of § 60(a), subsections (3) through (8), define "so far per-
fected as that no subsequent lien upon such property, obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings, could become superior to the rights of
the transferee.
93 § 60(b) prescribes an additional requirement for avoiding a preference:
Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor re-
ceiving it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference
thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor is insolvent.
Portland Newspaper does not raise a factual question under this section. See text
at notes 36-37 infra.9 4 UNrFoMr COIMUnCLIL CODE § 9-108 reads:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases
a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be
secured in whole or in part by after-acquired property his security in-
terest in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for
new value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the debtor ac-
quires his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of his
business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to the security
agreement within a reasonable time after new value is given.
95 In the author's opinion there can be only one answer to this question: §
60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act cannot accommodate Code § 9-108. See note
132 infra.
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the right and just (and righteous) result for this case?" Referee
Snedecor did not confuse the questions. Although he responded
properly to the first question, he devoted more of his opinion in
Portland Newspaper to the second question.9
Considerations of rightness and justice return us, as they did
Referee Snedecor, to the twin goals of avoidance of preference
and equity of distribution. The purpose of avoiding preferential
transfers is manifestly to provide for a more equitable distribution
among all creditors and, secondarily, to discourage creditors from
prolonging (by action or inaction with their powers over the
debtor) the period of insolvency before bankruptcy. The strong
connection between the two policy goals for preference and dis-
tribution makes it unreasonable to attempt to achieve fairness and
justice in a § 60 (a) case without weighty deliberation on the
decision's effect on the equity of allocation of assets in the bank-
rupt's estate.
97
To recapitulate a previous section of this article,93 the Bank-
ruptcy Act's ordering of precedence and priority in the distri-
bution of the bankrupt's assets is basically tripartite: first, the
satisfaction of perfected security interests in, and liens on, specific
property to the extent of the value of the property and in the
priority set by non-bankruptcy law; second, the satisfaction of
claims awarded "priority" standing by § 64 of the Bankruptcy
Act, in the rank specified in that section; and third, the satisfaction
of all other claims, including, in the case of a business entity, the
claims of equity owners and creditor entrepreneurs. This order
has existed without basic change for a century. The Bankruptcy
Act of 1867 introduced it, and the Act of 1898 carried it forward.99
96 Referee Snedecor seems to assume, in agreement with the law review
authors whom he cites favorably, that there is no difficulty on the basis of
legislative intention in holding that § 60(a) does not require deference to Code
§ 9-108.97 The connection is underscored in Portland Newspaper. See note 12.3
infra.9 8 See text at notes 21-27 supra.
99 Although "the status of secured creditors in their debtor's bankraptcy is
a problem of fundamental importance," 3 Cor.L=e, BA ucy ff 57.20 at 297
(14th ed. 1966), "the Bankruptcy Act does not exhaustively regulate the legal
situation of a secured creditor." Id. at 158. "Exhaustively regulate," indeed. The
secured creditor has three options: surrender his security and enter bankruptcy
court as a totally unsecured creditor; claim his security and claim as an unsecured
creditor the difference between the value of the security and the amount of the
debt asserted; or take his security and not make any claim. If he takes the first
option, he will be treated like any other unsecured creditor. If he elects the
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 55,
U. C. C. v. B-imuricy Acr
The Chandler Act amendments of 1938 thoroghly rewrote the
second order of precedence, i.e., the § 64 priorities, but made only
a few significant substantive changes.100 The first order has been
tinkered with from time to time in recent decades to affect the
status of state and federal tax liens, 01 and the alternatives to
straight bankruptcy, with their substituted distribution schemes,
were strengthened by the Chandler Act.102
The distribution order is necessarily archaic (or only coinci-
dentally modem) insofar as it traces back to 1867. The commercial
methods of that era have metamorphasized through several stages
to the present highly developed devices of business finance. To
almost the same extent, the changes in the order introduced in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
second, the valuation of his security will be subject to scrutiny under the express
mandate of § 57(h) of the Bankruptcy Act to bankruptcy courts. "The value of
securities held by secured creditors shall be determined .. .under the super-
vision and control of the court." Suppose, however, that the secured creditor
chooses only to take his security, without making any claim. "In that case .
there is no room for the application of Section 57(h)." Id. at 301. If the bank-
ruptcy trustee obtains possession of the collateral, the secured creditor must in-
tervene in the proceeding by moving to reclaim the specific property in which he
has a security interest. Suppose the worth of the property far exceeds the amount
of the claim. Can the bankruptcy court do anything about it, especially if there are
no other assets in the estate? Unless the bankruptcy court can invoke §§ 60, 67
or 70 the authority for reducing the secured creditor's recoupment is virtually
nonexistent. See 2 CoLLim, BANR upTcy ff 23.11 (14th ed. 1966); 4 CoLLm,
BANtRupTcy f1 70.39 (14th ed. 1966).
100See 3 CoaLnm, Bxaxurcy f 64.01 at 2046-48 (14th ed. 1966).
101 The most important changes were (a) consolidation of all administrative
expenses of the bankruptcy proceeding into a single first priority class; (b) ad-
vancement of wage claims from behind creditors' claims for expenses incurred in
resisting a confirmation or discharge to a second priority; (c) abolition of all state
priorities except claims for rent. For a word-for-word comparison between the
1898 and the 1938 versions of § 64, see 3 CoLL=, BArN-nupTrcy T 64.01, at
2049-50 (14th ed. 1966). The modifications represented special interests which
had been urged on the Chandler Act revisers and not any compromised pre-
ference for a radical alteration of the substance of § 64. See H.R. REP. No. 1409,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1937); Heaings on H.R. Doc. No. 6439, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 64, 158-60 (1937). Section 64 has been altered in small ways since
1938. For a contemporary paean of the plight of the unsecured creditor, see note
83 infra. See 3 CoL=mn, BAmmuprc U 64.01 at 2055-58 (14th ed. 1966).
102 Moore & Phillips D oS" AND Cmrrons RIGETS 3-30 (1966):
Compositions were brought into American bankruptcy law by an 1874
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. Section 12 of the Act of
1898 continued the composition as a device available in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings to both corporate and non-corporate debtors. New provisions
for compositions and extensions available to non-corporate debtors were
contained in § 74, added in 1933. At the same time, § 77 was added to
provide for reorganization of railroads, and in 1934 Congress added §
77B to provide for reorganization of other corporations.
All of these sections except § 77 were repealed by the Chandler
Act and replaced with Chap. X (Corporate Reorganization), Chap.
XI (Arrangements), Chap. XII (Real Property Arrangements by Persons
Other Than Corporations), and Chap. XIII (Wage Earners Plans).
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1898 are out-of-date. Even the minor Chandler Act modernization
occurred before the full development of secured financing as
represented by the Uniform Commercial Code. The first growth
of modem business financing, in the nineteenth century, produced
the non-possessory chattel mortgage (and other devices), which
facilitated the hypothecation of the most durable and tangible
assets of a business-its manufacturing machinery, service equip-
ment, and stock-in-trade.10 3 Working capital, however, came from
business entrepreneurs themselves, investors' capital, and un-
secured bank credit.104 By and large, accounts receivable and
other similar intangibles were not used as secured credit col-
lateral, although they have long been otherwise important in
commercial financing, especially in some trades. 0 5 When a
103 1 Gilmore, op. cit. supra note 90, § 2.1, 24-25. "The story of how the
equipment and the rolling stock and the stock in trade came to be available as
collateral is essentially the story of personal property security law in the nineteenth
century." Id. at 25.
104 We are talking about small businesses, corporate and non-corporate, as
they existed in the nineteenth century and as they exist today, and not about the
large corporate enterprises that have evolved during the same time.
The financial characteristics of large and small manufacturing corpora-
tions differ . . . with respect to various operating and balance sheet
relationships. The small enterprise relies more heavily upon short-term
funds for its financing than the large corporation: in relation to total
assets the smaller company has less funded debt and less net worth than
the large company, and more accounts payable and more notes payable.
In addition, the general credit position of the small corporation appears
to be not quite so strong as that of the large enterprise. For example, the
small company has a lower ratio of current assets to current liabilities, a
higher proportion of total debt represented by current items.
These comparisons indicate that small manufacturing corporations are
more susceptible to failure than large enterprises. The latter, since they
have a stronger liquidity position, can 'live on their surplus' for a longer
time, and thus during period of business strain they are more able to con-
tinue their former policies, both financial and economic. Furthermore,
the ownership structure of large companies-with a great many persons
directly dependent upon the enterprise-is such that a reorganization to
forestall general liquidation is usually arranged before the threat of in-
solvency becomes immediate. (Footnotes omitted.) MEawIN, FNANCIN'G
SMALL CoPoBATioNs 11 (1942).
105 Id. at 18:
Accounts receivable financing is not a new development. The open
account has long been recognized as one of the preferred assets of busi-
ness concerns; a good deal of the attention of the banker has always
been centered on the amount and quality of these accounts and on their
relation to other quantities in the corporate balance sheet. Beyond this,
the account receivable has been, for centuries, the specific basis of short-
term financing in the textile trades by individuals and concerns known as
'factors.'
Accounts receivable financing, as a technique for supplying funds to
business enterprises, evolved many years ago out of business demands
that went far beyond the need for advances of fimds. As early as the
fourteenth century, manufacturers and merchants in both foreign and
(Continued on next page)
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business went bankrupt, the secured creditors enforced their in-
terests in collateral, but second-order priority and general credi-
tors shared according to rank in at least the odds and ends of the
business, which the bankruptcy trustee liquidated in the windup
of the bankrupt's affairs.106
The second growth of modem business financing began in
the early twentieth century with the increased need for credit
brought on by expanding technology and the costliness of the
equipment it produced. 0 7 Stimulated in 1930's by the capital
drain of the Depression,"0 ' the second growth signified the develop-
ment and expanded volume of accounts receivable, 0 9 field ware-
house,'" and conditional sales financing."'
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
domestic trade felt the need for some specialized agency to perform a
selling and merchandising service for them (not unlike that offered by
the commission merchant in more recent times). Since sales were
generally made on credit terms of 30 days or longer, it proved to be
convenient for the agency responsible for making sales also to advise
on the wisdom of extending credit to any given buyer. Finally, this
agent (the "factor") undertook in some instances to absorb losses arising
out of credit sales by buying the open accounts so originated without
recourse on the seller (the factor's "client"). In effect, the seller or
manufacturer was placed in the position of making all sales for cash.
o OCf. note 114 infra.
10 7 
SAULNIER & JACOBY, FINANCING EQu'mENT FOR Co a rara.L AND IN-
DUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 15 (1944):
Technological progress and business competition have been the basic
conditions promoting the growth of installment equipment credit ....
Technological change has been operative over an increasingly wide area,
greatly increasing the market for both equipment and the financing
services frequently required for its acquisition. In the retailing and
service trades as well as in manufacturing industries, machinery and
equipment has [sic] become more and more essential to the successful
operation of business.
While large as well as small companies in all industries are affected
by the trend toward mechanization of production facilities it is notable
that concerns in the retail and service trades, where equipment financing
facilities are widely used, are typically small.
108 JACOBY & SAULNIER, FINANCING INVENTORY ON FIELD WAREHaousE RE-
cEIP'rs9 (1944):
Although . . . [the] credit devices (of term lending, accounts re-
ceivable financing, installment financing of commercial and industrial
equipment and field warehousing] emerged prior to the depression of
1929-32 .. ., it is clear that each of them expanded in both absolute
and relative significance under the depression and recovery conditions
of the 1930's.
109 Non-notification receivables financing "developed much later than old-
line factoring, not being practiced on any considerable scale until after 1908."
SAULNIER & JACOBY, op. cit. supra note 105, at 21.
110 "The business of field warehousig appears to have developed in the
United States after the turn of the twentieth century." JACOBY & SAuLNim, op.
cit. supra note 108, at 12.
111 See note 107 supra. The second growth has been signified by the ap-
(Continued on next page)
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The disparity between the economic model for distribution of
assets under the Bankruptcy Act and the changing realities of
commercial financing was mitigated for years-perhaps, for some
trends of financing, as long as a half century-by the failure of
state law to keep fully abreast of change. The law for perfecting
security interests tended to be either too cumbersome and un-
settled for compliance when applied to the most recent business
methods or inadequate to prevent the trustee in bankruptcy, in his
status of lien creditor or bona fide purchaser, from overcoming the
otherwise secured creditor on the date of bankruptcy. 112 Article
Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code not only has brought
uniformity among the states but also has moved state law into full-
est accommodation with the ways of modem financers for achiev-
ing maximum credit security. The "secret lien," the "pocket lien,"
and the "gap creditor" are banished; "total security," "bank-
ruptcy ownership," and the "disadvantaged creditor" blossom
under a nearly impervious legal umbrella.
The twentieth century law of "total security" obfuscates a
just and fair distribution of a bankrupt's estate under the Bank-
ruptcy Act's nineteenth-century order of distribution in three
ways. First, there is little property which a debtor has at one
time or can acquire in the future in which a creditor cannot ob-
tain a perfected security interest by a single agreement." 3 Full
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
pearance and the ascension of commercial finance companies in business financing.
See JACOBY & SAULNIEB, BusIEmss FINANcE AN BANmNrG 113, 114 (1947). The
banks went into the trade on a large scale only after the finance companies had
shown its success. Id. at 138.
1 12 See text at notes 105-08 supra.
113 Even cash. See Ur-aFopaj CoanvnnmcuL CODE § 94306 (Proceeds; Secured
Party's Rigbts on Disposition of Collateral). For an interesting account of how a
bankrupt corporations operators, tried to manipulate proceeds of accounts re-
ceivable during the four months insolvency period prior to barptcy, see Inre C. E. Pantz & Son, Inc., 2 UCO REtP. 1420 (E.D. Pa., Bankr. No. 27625, 1965)
2 UCC !EP. 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd without opinion, 3 UCO REP. 452 (3d
Cir. 1966). (Both the bankrupt and the bank seeking to reclaim the proceedslost). Under § 10(b) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (from which Code §
9-306 comes) it is tempting to digress on the conflict that arose over the validity
of proceeds financing in Bankruptcy Court. Cf. In the Matter of Harpeth Motors,
Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955), with In the Matter of CrosstownMotors, Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811 (1960).
There has, however, already been ample digression in the Law Review Arena.See especially Henson 'Proceeds' Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COL.
LC . 22, 245-46 1965).
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use of the security interest power can radically change the estab-
lished goals of bankruptcy distribution.114 For example, suppose
that a creditor or group of creditors organizes a business which
requires only a small investment to begin operations. 115 They
provide the initial operating cash or persuade a "proprietor" to
provide it. They take a security interest in all of the property of
the business including inventory and receivables." 6 If further
operating capital is needed, they advance it under the terms of
their security agreement. When the business is well established,
they permit the unsecured debts owed to suppliers and employees
to accumulate until the business is insolvent, i.e., until the debts
exceed the net worth of the business.117 Eventually the proprietor
or unsecured creditors initiate bankruptcy proceedings. The se-
cured creditors now own the business,118 the proprietor has lost
whatever he put into it,".9 and the priority and unsecured creditors
have been liquidated out of the balance sheet.120 The original se-
114 See note 124 infra. In terms only of who gets how much in the distribution
money, the change can not be radical. "In liquidation cases, the unsecured creditor
recovers almost nothing from a bankrupt debtor. In the fiscal year ending June
30, 1965, for example, the courts disposed of 145,655 straight bankruptcy cases.
Of these, 18,513 were "asset" cases, with an average payment to creditors of
$5,227 per case. An additional 19,008 cases were "nominal asset" cases, in
which assets of the estate were consumed by administrative costs, and in the
remaining 108,134 cases there were no assets available after exemptions. Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics,
Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1965, Comments, pp. 1-7.
"In the relatively few asset cases, secured creditors were paid 60.7% of their
claims, and unsecured creditors received 7.5%. Id. at Table F.6. An examination
of these statistics for the last twenty years indicates that when an unsecured
creditor is fortunate enough to find some assets in the debtor's estate, on the
average he is not likely to recover more than eight or nine cents on the dollar."
Note, 8 BosToN COLLEGE INDUSTrIAL & Coammcmi L. RBv. 101, 112 n.71
(1966).
115 Or take over an established business that promises growth but is
undercapitalized.
116 '[Article 91 provides in substance that anything that is property, tangible
or intangible, can be the subject matter of a security interest." (Footnote omitted).
2 GmsonRE, op. cit. supra note 90, at § 45.5. p. 1305. Is Article Nine "Property"
coextensive with Bankruptcy Act "property?" See Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11
U.S.C. § 110(a) (1952). The answer would seem to be yes, at least in typical
business circumstances. See note 117 infra.
117 In our hypothetical of a continuing business the valuation of its property
for purposes of determining insolvency must be calculated on the basis of a
going concern, with a realistic estimate of the goodwill that a bankruptcy
business can have, and not on the basis of of the aggregate values of separate
items of property. See 1 Cornsm, BANKruuprcy II 1.19 at 119-21 (14th ed. 1966).
118 See note 122 infra.
119 The proprietor would of course not be a creditor.
120 Cf. Kossack & Davidson, Bankruptcy Fraud, Alliance for Enforcement, 40
REF. J. 12, 18-19, 30-31 (1966).
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cured creditors are free to set their already-established business
back in motion again, debt free1' 1 and capital gained. -2
121 Inasmuch as some debts, such as tax and wage liabilities, survive dis-
charge in bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 85 (1966), it is neces-
sary that the bankrupt business be the person of a corporation which disappears
upon bankruptcy.
=2 Suppose the business as an ongoing concern is worth $20,000, as con-
servatively estimated as the condition of bankruptcy justifies. The secured credi-
tors hold a security interest in the entire business, valid against attack under §§
60, 67, or 70 of the Bankruptcy Act. They have advanced to the bankrupt a total
of $14,000 which remains unrepaid. Unsecured claims total $11,000. The secured
creditors do not file a claim as creditors of the bankrupt, but instead institute a
reclamation proceeding for the entire business. Do they obtain all the property
and in fact become owners-by-bankruptcy, getting $6,000 in increased value and
shutting out unsecured creditors? See supra, note 99.
The Uniform Commercial Code itself should prevent such a manifestly unjust
result. Article 9, Part 5 ("Default")-an unholy scriptual quagmire-authorizes
secured creditors to take possession of collateral on default, § 9-508, and permits
them to dispose of it in any commercially reasonable way. Section 9-504(1).
However, the secured parties must account to the debtor for any surplus from
the sale. Section 9-504(2). (It should be noted that there are special rules for
enforcing a sale of accounts on default. Sections 9-502, 9-504(2).) If the secured
creditors who have obtained possession of the property in which they have held
a security interest prefer to keep the property in full satisfaction of the debt, as
they would in our example, § 9-505(2) of the Code requires that they give
written notice to the debtor (and to any other party secured by the same col-
lateral) and allows the noticed party thirty days from receipt of the notification
in which to object. If the party objects, the secured creditors must dispose of the
collateral according to the rules of § 9-504, which include paying over any surplus.
Because under § 70(a) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act the bankrupt's trustee is vested
with his powers for personal benefit, the trustee would have the right of objection
after the secured creditors had reclaimed the property.
Of course, the disposition of the collateral under the secured parties direction
permits, as it always has permitted, a good deal of self-serving manipulation, even
under the Code's standard of commercial reasonableness and the other protective
provisions of Part 5 of Article 9. The requirement of a public sale, which would
apply in our example, § 9-504(3), is a notoriously weak guarantee of righteous
conduct "The concourse of bidders at the typical foreclosure sale, be it ever
so 'public,' is apt to be about as lively as a group of mourners at a funeral." 2
Gilmore, op. cit. supra note 90, at § 44.6, p. 1242. Moreover, in accord with pre-
vious law, the secured party is not prohibited from purchasing at his own sale.
Section 9-504(3). Although the separately-stated provisions in § 9-507 for re-
viewing in court the secured party's failure to comply with all of Part 5s require-
ments do not very well ventilate the miasma of foreclosure, the Code's vulner-
ability to corruption should be overcome in bankruptcy court by the charge to
bankruptcy decision-makers to do equity.
Suppose, however, that the secured creditors have taken possession of the
collateral and have given notice of intention not to dispose of the property and
that the debtor (and anyone else noticed) has failed to respond within 30 days.
Suppose further that the debtor is not plunged into bankruptcy until after these
events have occurred. Do the secured creditors become bankruptcy owners of all
of the collateral, without obligation to return surplus and free from the claims of
unsecured creditors? The demands of the Code have been met; it is too late for
the trustee, in the shoes of the debtor, to take advantage of any Code provisions
except, possibly, § 9-507, if the secured creditors' conduct can be assailed. How-
ever, §§ 60, 67(d)(2), or 67(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Act may apply, if there
has been a preferential or fraudulent "transfer" of the debtor's property within
four months §§ 60 and 67(d)(3)) or 1 year (§ 67(d)(2)). Was the debtors
failure to object to the secured party's rentention of the collateral without
tiontinued on next page)
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Portland Newspaper is not such an extreme case, and such
economic malevolency cannot, on the facts, be attributed to the
creditors asserting security interests in the newspaper's accounts
receivables. Nevertheless, Referee Snedecor recognized the ten-
dency toward total security and its unfair effect on the bank-
ruptcy distribution:
The old-fashioned method of operating a business on the
strength of equity capital and unsecured bank credit based
upon the financial integrity of the debtor seems to be giving
away to the modem trend of financing business operations in
reliance upon a floating lien on current assets with little or no
regard for equity capital. Added to this is the more recent
development of leasing, instead of owning, plant and equip-
ment. These methods leave the daily suppliers and employees
in a perilous position. The instant case furnishes a dramatic
illustration in which the priority labor claims amount to
nearly $43,000. Employees furnished the labor to publish
and deliver the newspapers that gave rise to the receivables
in controversy. The moneys advanced by the creditors claim-
ing security long since had been dissipated in operating
losses. If these floating liens are valid, the wage claimants
may receive not more than fifteen per cent on their claims out
of the free assets.12
3
The second assault on fair distribution in bankruptcy arises
from Article Nine's notice-filing provision. Section 9-402 states
that:
A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor
and the secured party, gives an address of the secured party
from which information concerning the security interest can
be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and con-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
disposition by sale a "transfer" under these provisions? The answer would seem
to be yes, because the secured creditors certainly gained more "property' by the
debtor's failure to object than they previously held by a security interest in the
collateral for a debt of a significantly smaller value. See infra note 32. After all, a
transfer is a transfer is a transfer. Cf. supra note 90.
Even if the Code's rules or bankruptcy's equity prevails against secured
creditors where collateral exceeds debt, the exchange of (1) a security interest
in the property (for a debt of $14,000) plus a payment of $6,000 for (2) a debt-
free business valued at $20,000 in bankruptcy may not be such a bad bargain,
especially after the stigma of insolvency has been worn away from the business.
123 See Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors, 17
STAN. L. RE v. 822, 840 (1965), quoted by Referee Snedecor in Portland News-
paper at 214.
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tains a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral.
1 2 4
To whom is the statement sufficient? Inasmuch as the New
Righteousness of the secured creditor rests heavily on the Code's
system of notice-filing, which purports to overcome the fraud of
secret liens, this is an especially pertinent question. Is it adequate
warning to a potential bankrupt's employees, small-time suppliers,
and casual vendors? Can any kind of filed notice justify omitting
them entirely or almost entirely from the bankruptcy distri-
bution?125 As total security becomes widespread the logical al-
ternatives to taking the risk will reduce to one alternative: ceasing
altogether to be a small-time supplier, an employee, or a casual
vendor. The notion that employees, like the wage-earners in Port-
124 Id. at 218:
There is no requirement that ... [the filing statement] contain any in-
formation concerning the limit of the credit to be extended, the amounts
advanced or to be advanced or the terms of payment. All such informa-
tion must be obtained from the secured party. The desired information
may vary from day to day according to advances made. So that the in-
formation obtained one day may not serve as a criterion for credit a
few days or weeks later. There seems to be no requirement that the
secured party furnish the desired information in writing. Oral information
would be of little value to an inquiring creditor who may have in
contemplation the extension of credit to the debtor on a secured
basis.
In National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., Inc., 191 N.E.2d 471
(Mass. 1963), a conditional seller sued a finance company in tort for conversion
of a cash register sold to the proprietor of the Kozy Kitchen. Before the cash
register was delivered to the buyer and before the seller had perfected its interest
in it, the finance company, in consideration of conontemporaneous loan of $1,911,
perfected a security interest in
the following goods, chattels, and automobiles, namely: The business
located at and numbered 574 Washington Street, Canton, Mass. to-
gether with all its good-will, fixtures, equipment and merchandise. The
fixtures specifically consist of the following: All contents of luncheonette
including equipment such as: booths and tables; stand and counter;
tables; chairs; booths; steam tables; salad unit; potato peeler; U. S.
Slicer; range; case; fryer; compressor; bobtail; milk dispenser; silexq
100 Class air conditioner; signs; pastry case; mixer; dishes; silverware;
tables; hot fudge; Haven Ex.; 2 door statianwagon 1957 Ford No. A57-
R107215 together with all property and articles now, and which may
hereafter be used or mixed with, added or attached to, and/or substi-
tuted for, any of the foregoing described property. (quoting from the
security agreement). Id. at 472.
In its financing statement the finance company indicated its collateral only as
"All contents of luncheonette." Id. at 475. Shortly thereafter the proprietor de-
faulted on both the security agreement and the sales contract. The finance
companv took possession of the cash register and promptly sold it. The conversion
suit followed. The court held for the defendant finance company, concluding that
under the Code the seller had a prior perfected security interest in the cash
register.
125 The origins of notice-filing in the law of real property transactions hardly
supports justification-by-analogy.
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land Newspaper, have any realistic option is of course preposterous
under almost any conditions. The likeliest party to benefit under
the Code notice requirements is the security-conscious financer
who needs to know whether another financer has already taken a
(maximum) security interest in the property of a proposed debtor.
The third distortion of equitable distribution is the Code's
permission for any secured creditor to allow the debtor unfet-
tered control of all collateral (except where perfection depends
on possession)., 2 The secured creditor is relieved from the com-
mercial nuisance of taking possession of, segregating, marking, or
in any other way identifying his interest in the collateral. He is
also placed in the advantageous position of hearing no evil, seeing
no evil, and speaking no evil. If an anxious supplier does check
the files for financing statements and does make inquiries of a
secured party whose address is shown, the secured party is in a
legally strong position to respond that, yes, he believes the business
is sound and, no, he does not presently know of any reason pre-
maturely to enforce his security interest because of weakness in
the debtor's financial condition.2 7
More importantly, the Code's permissiveness may have the
effect of promoting bankruptcy, both its occurrence and the
severity of the losses which it imposes. The secured creditor,
especially the totally secured creditor, is in the strongest position
to influence the conduct and course of his debtor's business. He
can possess the economically and legally effective tools128 for
forcing the debtor to remain within the bounds of financial safety,
to improve the management of his business, and to take a more
realistic view of its future. By the Code's relief from any manda-
tory requirement that the creditor exercise his power in order to
save his security, the opportunity to prevent bankruptcy or lessen
its impact may be lost, as it seems to have been lost in Portland
Newspaper. 
2 9
126 Usirvoa Conmcnu. CODE § 9-205.
127 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 60(b); See text at note 136 infra.
128The Code does not of course prohibit or hinder the secured creditor's
control over the debtor's business. See, e.g., Unrotmd Coi% aimCIAL CODE § 9-205,
Comment 5 (1962).
129 Portland Newspaper at 211:
Admittedly if Rose City had retained in its agreement the policing pro-
visions of Section 2.5 of the printed form and had insisted upon their
observance, it might have avoided the preference challenge. Require-
(Continued on next page)
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The underlying conflict between the Bankruptcy Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code arises from the difference between
the models of business transactions which the two codifications
postulate. Although Portland Newspaper does not raise all of the
section-against-section incongruities and conflicts between the
Act and the Code, it does strike at the heart of the dislocation
between two systems of law which should be interrelated har-
moniously. Throughout the history of present and prior bank-
ruptcy acts, the policy of equity and equality for the distribution
of a bankrupt's assets has been practiced through an order of
precedence and priority which, when applied in cases governed
by the Code's economic model, may not result in the realization
of the policy at all.
This is what the shooting is about. This is the conflict that
must be resolved to halt the anguish on the battleground of flesh
and blood cases. It is not primarily a question of internal con-
sistency in the Code, of adequacy of notice to unsecured creditors,
of the supremacy of federal law over state law, of the need to
change the Code to accord with the Bankruptcy Act, of the failure
of bankruptcy referees properly to apply Code provisions, or of
the necessity of always protecting the secured creditor.130 Although
these questions may have significance as independent and second-
ary problems, they do not go to the heart of the conflict and their
answers will not resolve the conflict.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ments such as these are insisted upon by sophisticated lenders. They
require that all checks, draft4, cash and other remittances in part or
full payment of any collateral be deposited in a cash collateral account
over which the secured party alone shall have the power of withdrawal
Pending such deposit the debtor must not commingle any collections
with any other funds, but must hold the proceeds separate and apart
therefrom upon an express trust for the secured party until deposited in
the cash collateral account. It is usually agreed that once each week the
secured party will apply the whole or any part of the collected funds
in the cash collateral account against the principal or interest of the
advances made against the collateral, and new loans similarly are made
upon the assignment of new accounts. This revolving credit arrange-
ment enables the secured creditor to keep his financial finger on the busi-
ness pulse of his debtor. Thus a sound and healthy business relation-
ship may be maintained between creditor and debtor.
13o Among partisans of the secured creditors there is an unseemly weakness
for elevating the threat of the secured creditors' reduction and withdrawal of
credit to the order of ghoulies and ghosties and longleggedy beasties and things
that go bump in the night. Statements, such as "the instant decision [in Portland
Newspaper] is unwise, . . . because the debtor will not be able to secure long-
term loans on future inventory or receivables," Note, 44 TEXAs L. Ruv. 1369,
(Continued on next page)
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VI. RESOLUTION
Portland Newspaper is an easy case. The claims of two of the
creditors asserting security interests in the bankrupt's accounts
receivable can be relegated to the status of unsecured claims with-
out reaching any conflict between the Bankruptcy Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code.131 The claims of a third creditor do
raise the conflict, but the narrow issue for decision, whether § 9-
108 of the Code can prevail over the trustee's power under § 60
of the Act, allows the referee simultaneously to apply the letter
of the law and to effectuate the policy of a just distribution. The
legislative history of § 60 (1) of the Act clearly supports the de-
cision that § 9-108 cannot prevail, because Congress has consi-
stently intended to banish the doctrine of relation-back,"'1 on
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
1377 (1966), are too facile. It is better to investigate underlying economic reali-
ties and not to underestimate the ability of lenders to rise above the spectre of
defeat in bankruptcy court.
131 Portland Newspaper at 200-09.
132 Although an exhaustive study of the legislative history of § 60(a) would
take the investigator back to 1898, when the present Bankruptcy Act was originally
passed by Congress, it is necessary only to revert to the Chandler Act of 1938.
In amending § 60(a) it sought to strengthen the bankruptcy trustee's power to
avoid preferential transfers. Professor James A. McLaughlin, on behalf of the
National Bankruptcy Conference, shepherded the explanation of the Chandler
bill (which the Conference had prepared) through the June 1937 hearings be-
fore the House Committee on the Judiciary. House Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 120-25 (1937). When the Committee reached § 60 the following
exchanges took place:
Professor McLaughlin:
We are trying to strike down the special advantages that those who are
in peculiarly friendly relations with the bankrupt, either in a family way
or in a business way, are able to get; or the advantages that those who
are in a peculiarly strong economic position with reference to the bank-
rupt are able to get. Id. at 120.
[W]hen it comes to the question of setting aside a transfer that
has already been made, which discriminates unfairly in favor of a given
creditor, there is where the bankruptcy power is the only adequate power
in this country. Id. at 120-21.
(The Professor recited the case of Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 (1905),
in which the Court applied state law permitting relation-back to uphold a
mortgage on horses acquired within four months of bankruptcy.)
Now, the Chandler bill provides that the time that you look at, in
considering the elements of preference, is the time when this transfer
is perfected, insofar as it may be.
MR. MICHnENM. Regardless of what you call the fiction of State law?
MR. JAME-S A. McLAuGHLrN. Yes.
MR. CELLER. Where is that language?
MR. JAims A. McLAu GHIN. Would you like to have it in the com-
mittee print?
MR. CELLER. Yes. Id. at 123.
(Professor McLaughlin then read into the record the bill's proposed § 60(a),
(Continued on next page)
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which the section depends for legitimacy. 33 The outcome against
§ 9-108 and against Rose City's claim of a Code-perfected security
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the exact language of which, except for details not here relevant, was subsequently
enacted by Congress.)
Now, there has been very little difference of opinion in the bankruptcy
conference about the essential desirability of strengthening the law of
preference. To my mind, it is the heart of the whole business. We have
had very few people that would in any way defend these cases.
There would be the possibility of cuttting down the trustees' status
from that of a bona-fide purchaser to the status that he has under the
1910 amendment to section 47, of a lien holder. That would be less
radical and would still knock out these fictions of "relation back" under
State law which seem to me to be in the teeth of the policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
The precise compromise that we agreed upon-not by reason of a
clash of conflicting interests but just as a bunch of intelligent gentlemen
talking this thing over, in view of what would seem to be a reasonable
balance-we decided to draw the line somewhere in between keeping
the status of the trustee where it is under the act of 1898 and carry-
ing out the full intention, or the full apparent intention, of the amend-
ment of 1926, which would have given the trustee a right to attack that
transfer, even if there was no particular class of persons as to whom it
was required to be recorded. We limit to cases where it does have to be
recorded in order to bind a bona fide purchaser.
Mn. CELLER. You speak for the conference; there is no dissenting
voice heard in that connection?
MR. J. A. MCLAuGHLIn. My friends tell me not. Id. at 124-25.
In 1950 Congress amended § 60(a) again, primarily to replace the compromise
bona fide purchaser standard with a lien creditor test (see note 54 supra) and to
recognize state laws permitting a brief period (up to 21 days) for perfecting
security interests without vulnerability to intervening creditors. In its report, the
House Committee on the Judiciary states initially a third objective, however:
"(A) To retain unimpaired the basic object of the 1938 amendment, which
eliminated the "relation back" doctrine of Sexton v. Kessler.. .. " H. R. REP. No.
1293. 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912), is the famous case in which Mr. Justice
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld a creditors right to securities
transferred to it within four months of the bankruptcy of its debtor, whom it
knew to be insolvent. Several years previously the debtor bad agreed to maintain
a certain amount of negotiable securities in escrow deposit for the creditor's
protection against the debtor's drawings. The creditor authorized the debtor to
substitute the securities in escrow, which, with notification to the creditor. it did
from time to time. When the debtor became insolvent during the panic of 1907,
the creditor took possession of the securities. Shortly thereafter the debtor was
adjudicatd a bankrupt.
Justice Holmes stated: "The bankruptcy law by itself does not avoid the
transaction.... A trustee in bankruptcy does not stand like an attaching creditor;
he gets no lien by the mere fact of his appointment." 225 U.S. at 97. In the
loose law-making of pre-Erie days, the Justice decided that the parties had not
violated any state or other law which would prevent holding that the creditor had
obtained an equitable right in the securities from the date of the original agree-
ment, as the parties had intended. In the course of his opinion he also noted:
"Whether enough has been done to give a right of any kind in certain property
is a question of more or less." 225 U.S. at 98, and concluded that the parties,
acting in good faith and without benefit of lawyers, had done enough. At no
place does Holmes reveal any concern for other creditors of the banlkrut or at-
tribute any particular significance to the fact that the dehtor. Kessler & Co. of
New York, was "intimately connected," 225 U.S at 95, with the creditor, Kessler
& Co. of Manchester, England.
V.13 See text at note 90 supra.
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interest results in a fund sufficient to satisfy the second-order
priority claims for administrative expenses and back wages before
the creditors who did nothing to police their shifting collateral or
to forestall the severity of the bankrupt's insolvency.134
Portland Newspaper is, at the same time, a hard case because
it may make bad law, i.e., it may promote confusion and uncer-
tainty. By Referee Snedecor's own report, it is the first case to
raise "the precise question ... in a court of bankruptcy."'135 The
limits of the "precise question," however, are very narrow. The
case is neither the first nor the last one to raise the underlying
conflict between the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
The decision may be construed as a signal precedent against
the interests of secured creditors or as a strong precedent favoring
unsecured creditors. Secured creditors are sure to cry that, at the
very least, it creates uncertainty concerning the strength of their
Code-protected transactions in bankruptcy court, even in cases
which involve established patterns of financing in established
kinds of business which are neither as commercially atypical nor
as much in the interest of the general public as the publishing
venture involved in Portland Newspaper. Moreover, the next case
raising precisely the same question may be even further removed
from the ultimates of "total security" and "bankruptcy owner-
ship"; it may involve, for example, security interests in solely
after-acquired inventory held by creditors adhering to the most
conservative financing practices.
There are three responses to these apprehensions, in addition
to the straw of court reversal of Referee Snedcor's decision and
judicial reconstruction of § 60 (a) in the Code's favor. First, the
creditor can keep his conduct within the protection of § 60 (b) of
the Act, which permits a preference to be avoided only if the
creditor gaining by it "has, at the time when the transfer is made,
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." The
standard set by this requirement" 6 grants considerable latitude to
134 See text at notes 58, 128 supra.
13
5 Portland Newspaper 228; Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp 635 (D.
Mass. 1967), reported since this article was written decides the same question,
with a lightly reasoned opinion, contra Portland Pubishing.
136Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Quittner, 176 F.2d 997, 998-99 (9th Cir.
1949) : The creditor cannot be charged with knowledge, or its equivalent,
where a mere ground for suspicion exists. Grant v. National Bank, 97
(Continued on next page)
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the bankruptcy decision-maker to allow property acquired by the
debtor within the four months' insolvency period to pass to the
creditor of the antecedent debt, if the creditor has been dealing
at arm's length with the debtor and has not defaulted on any
equitable obligation to take charge of a debtor whom he ought to
know is, or is about to become, insolvent. 137 Notwithstanding the
attraction of doing justice in individual cases, extensive use of §
60 to defeat secured creditors would destroy the reliability and uni-
formity of the Code, so important to the financer's economic
serenity. Second, the creditor can forego the operational ad-
vantages of § 9-205 and police his collateral so that he does not
have security in "after-acquired" property. 13 As unattractive as
this alternative may be, its cost (when used selectively, according
to the risk of a transaction) in the long run may prove to be (a)
passable to the debtor or (b) less than losses in bankruptcy
court.139 Third, secured creditors can press for a Congressional
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act which will better accommodate
their business methods.
Unsecured creditors, in their relatively unorganized and ill-
represented state, are likely to continue their lament about the
iniquity of the Code. The precision of the question in Portland
Newspaper so restricts the utility of the case as an on-all-fours
precedent that it is not likely to affect in the unsecured creditors'
favor the great bulk of Code-dominated bankruptcy cases. In his
concern for a just distribution, Referee Snedecor's considerations
ranged far beyond the limits of his power over Code transactions.
If all of the secured creditors' transactions had been propery per-
fected under the Code and all security had attached prior to the
four months' insolvency time (or the preferred creditors had not
had "reasonable cause to believe" the debtor's insolvency), the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
U.S. 80. He should not be required to make inquiries which could only
appear necessary after he had the hindsight of later events. Due regard
must be had for what is common business practice-the standards of the
prudent business person should not be unrealistic. Harrison v. Merchants
National Bank, 124 F.2d 871....
See also Hoppe v. Bittenhouse, 279 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1960); Snider v. England,
2 Bankr. L. Rep.
62,114 (9th Cir. 1967); Hassan v. Vones, 2 Bankr. L. Rep.
62,087 (9th Cir. 1967).
137 The UNFORM CoamrnvcLA.L CODE § 9-301 protects the creditor with a
perfected security interest from the avoiding power of the bankruptcy trustee
under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. See text at note 81 .supra.
138 See notes 128, 129 supra.
139 See note 130 supra.
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referee's efforts would have been ineffective, and the Bankruptcy
Act's deference to state law would have impregnable. The
trustee could not have set aside any of the asserted security
interests, and the distribution of the bankrupt's assets would have
been inequitable and unjust under the policy of the Act.
Assuming that Portland Newspaper is upheld on appeal and
that in like cases the Bankruptcy Act prevails over the Code, there
are perhaps only two other balms for the unsecured and priority
creditors' lament. The first is to urge bankruptcy decision-makers
increasingly to use the power of "equitable subordination" that
inheres in bankruptcy as a proceeding in equity. The power has
lurked in the shadwos, in spite of strong endorsement by the Su-
preme Court,140 and generally has been invoked in only certain
lines of cases. 141 Any bankruptcy decision that contradicts the pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code without express author-
ity of one of the avoiding powers enumerated in §§ 60, 67, and
70 of the Act especially risks the wrath of the Secured Creditors
and their Protectors. Although to the author's knowledge the
power of equitable subordination has not been used against the
Code, it is possible that the constiutional supremacy of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and its mandate to do equity could uphold such a
decision, especially where a contrary outcome would result in ex-
treme injustice to priority and other unsecured creditors.14
140Prudence Corp. v. Geist, 816 U.S. 89, 95 (1942):
Nothing decided in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, requires a
court of bankruptcy to apply.., a local rule governing the liquidation of
insolvent estates. The bankruptcy act prescribes its own criteria for dis-
tribution to creditors. In the interpretation and application of federal
statutes, federal not local law applies. [Citations omitted] The court of
bankraptcy is a court of equity to which the judicial administration of
the bankrupt's estate is committed, Securities & Exchange Commission
v. U. S. Realty Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455-457, and it is for that court-
not without appropriate regard for rights acquired under rules of state
law-to define and apply federal law in determining the extent to which
the inequitable conduct of a claimant in acquiring or asserting his claim
in bankruptcy requires its subordination to other claims which, in other
respects, are of the same class.
141 See Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bank-
ruptcy, 15 VAND. L. Ray. 83 (1961). The authors classify the grounds for sub-
ordination in the following categories: Agreement (consensual subordination),
debt or proprietary interest ("capital contribution"), fraud, illegality, fiduciary
relationship, and instrumentality ("alter ego"). Id. at 90-112.
142See note 140 supra.
Of course, if the secured creditor files a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, he
submits himself to the power of the bankruptcy court under § 57(h) of the
Bankruptcy Act to determine the value of the security held by the secured
creditor. See note 99 supra.
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The second solution is more realistic as law and less obtainable
in fact. The Unsecured Creditors, regrouping and rehabilitating
their Champions from the steamrollering of the Code sweep,
could attempt to obtain from Congress a thorough revision of the
Bankruptcy Act's century-old distribution order which would re-
flect, on a par with the Code, today's methods of business finance.
There is precedent for altering the distribution order, especially
in the piecemeal adjustment of the status of state and federal tax
liens.
143
143 The status of state and federal statutory liens, among which tax liens
now predominate, has been changed by amendments to the Bankruptcy Act in
1938, 1952, and 1966. There is little authoritative legislative history which ex-
plains the 1938 and 1952 changes. In 1938, concern focused on the statutory lien
of landlords. See, e.g., House Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 159-60
(1937); H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16, 34 (1937). In 1952
the Congressional reports accompanying the amending bill did not clarify the
reasons for or the import of the change. See 4 CoLLm, BANKrupTcY ff 67.281
note 1, at 310. The following explanation, whose author was then Chairman of
the National Bankruptcy Conference and had been a member of the Conference
during the period when the Chandler Act was drafted, is probably the best
comment:
It is proposed to amend § 67c in several respects, of which only one
goes to substance. You will recall that in the overhauling of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, one of the objectives of the Chandler Act of 1938
was to build up, as far as feasible and equitable, the residual fund for
distribution among the general unsecured creditors. To achieve this, in
part, § 64 was amended by deleting therefrom the priority given to a
multiplicity of priorities created or recognized by State laws, and, in a
complete revision of § 67, a new subdivision c was inserted, imple-
menting some of the changes in § 64a by subordinating, in the circum-
stances specified, statutory liens to the priorities for administration ex-
penses under clause (1) and for wages under clause (2) of § 64a.
However, the new subdivision c of § 67 did not parallel in its scope the
above noted deleted provision for State priorities. It is, therefore, pro-
tosed to amend § 67c, within the pattern of its scheme by providing
that statutory liens created or recognized by State laws for debts owing
to any person, including any State or subdivision thereof, on personal
property not accompanied by possession of, or by levy upon or sequestra-
tion of, such property, shall not be valid against a trustee in bankruptcy.
This proposed change, it is believed, will measurably carry out the
objective above indicated and should effectively check the growing trend
in State statutes of labeling as "liens" what essentially are "priorities"
and thereby seek to evade the scheme of priorities as set up in § 64a.
Weinstein, Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act As Proposed and Pending
Before the Congress, 24 REP. J. 28, 32 (1950).
Even this statement does not fully explain why it was believed necessary in
the late 1940's and early 1950's to further strengen § 67(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act. The root of the necessity seems to have been the conversion of the state"priorities" abolished by the Chandler Act into "liens" merely by changing the
label in the statutes. For an example of one states conduct, see Louisville Title
Mort. Co. v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 224, 225-26, 184 S.W.2d 963, 964 (1945).
§ 67(c) (1) did not attack such liens as thoroughly as amended § 64 attacked
state priorities; the insertion of subsection (2) into § 67(c) in 1952 was designed
to close the loophole.
(Continued on next page)
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The content of such a new law is beyond the scope of this
monograph and speculation. Several guidelines for its creation can
be suggested, however: first, that the revision be based on as
thorough an economic study of the effect of maximal use of Code
devices on Bankruptcy distributions as time and resources per-
mit; 4 4 second, that some hard philosophizing be directed toward
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Unfortunately, the effect of the new § 67(c) was obscure; it created a
notorious problem of circularity of liens which different courts resolved in different,
conflicting ways. The 1966 amendment successfully replaced the obscurity with
specific, more detailed language for § 67(c) (and § 67(b)); obviated circularity
of liens under the section; and generally brought it up to date.
In addition, Congress in 1966 amended the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6322,
6323 to protect secured creditors from federal tax liens by requiring notice-
filing for the government to take priority and amended § 70(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act expressly to make the bankruptcy trustee's interest superior to an un-
recorded tax lien and thus to incorporate into statute the decision of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965).
Whose fight has the successful agitation for subordination of tax liens been-
the secured creditor's or the unsecured creditor's? On the basis of events in re-
cent years it seems to have been more a compromise between the secured creditors
and the Treasury Department than any creditor-to-creditor match. See Plumb, The
New Federal Tax Lien Law, 53 A.B.A.J. 66 (1967). However, in pre-Code days
the crudgels of the unsecured creditors were waved, at least in the law review
arena:
While asserting that the humane and beneficent Bankruptcy Law in
liberating the unfortunate debtor from the burden of his debts is a matter
of public concern let us also give heed to the mournful plaint of the
great class of creditors who extend liberal credit to the bankrupt, on an
unsecured basis. Let not the primary purpose of this law-to distribute
the debtor's assets among his creditors, be an idle gesture comparable
with the lip service of the hypocritical Pharisee. Veritably as we note
under § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, the order of payment of debt and
distribution of the bankrupt's assets, the unsecured creditor as "the for-
gotten man" deserves our sympathy, sufficient to arouse the apathetic
merchant groups throughout our country to the end that the Congress
should immediately enact appropriate legislation to relieve bankrupt
estates of the onerous burdens of tax claims and to permit, on an equita-
ble basis, the unsecured creditor to receive, in a more substantial man-
ner, a greater distributive share of the assets. The welfare of the mer-
chant, the unsecured creditor, is also a matter of grave public concern!
Duberstein, Tax Clains As Bankruptcy Problem, 44 Coint. L.J. 411,
415 (1939).
14 Perhaps the current Brookings Institution study of bankruptcy problems
is considering the distribution order. A spokesman for the Institution has pro-
claimed:
The Brookings study is a fresh look at the goals, the assumptions, the
impact, the methods, the organization structure of the bankruptcy system.
. . . [W]e are interested in questions of solvency or insolvency before
and after straight bankruptcy. . . . [W]e shall give some study to con-
ditions that go before formal proceedings and to the results of the pro-
ceedings for the discharged individual or the reorganized corporation.
We are interested also in evaluating possible feasible alternatives to
present ways of doing business. Stanley, The Brookings Institution Study
of Bankruptcy, 40 REF. J. 4, 5 (1966).
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modem economics and its notions of business equity; 145 third, that
the possibility of elaborate provisions tailored to a number of
basic, recurring bankruptcy-situations not be summarily rejected
because of an ingrained abhorrence of statutory complexity.14
This proposal is not for the Milquetoast Champion of Un-
secured Creditors who prefers the heavenly illusions of angels to
the sweaty reality of homed beasts. Notwithstanding the en-
camped presence of the Code in almost every jurisdiction, the
advocate should take courage from the words of Mr. Justice
Sutherland, reflecting on the extensions of bankruptcy legislation
in the United States during the nineteenth century:
The fundamental and radically progressive nature of these
extensions becomes apparent upon their mere statement; but
all have been judicially approved or accepted as falling with-
in the power conferred by the bankruptcy clause of the
Constitution. Taken altogether, they demonstrate in a very
striking way the capacity of the bankruptcy clause to meet
new conditions as they have been disclosed as a result of
the tremendous growth of business and development of hu-
man activities from 1800 to the present day. And these acts,
far-reaching though they be, have not gone beyond the limit
of congressional power; but rather have constituted ex-
tensions into a field whose boundaries may not yet be fully
revealed.1
47
145 Some questions: Who should bear the brunt of losses caused by
business failure? By what criteria shall this question be answered? For example, on
the basis of business negligence or culpable intentions? Or on ability to absorb
the loss, either against profits or by passing it on? More broadly: what should
be the role of bankruptcy in business failure?
146 See e.g., Pub. L. No. 719, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (Oct. 13, 1966).
which amended §§ 6322 and 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. U95
6322, 6323 (1954). The full danger of complexity must be recognized, however.
Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, as redrafted in 1950, is an earlier example of
the art nouveau in statutory composition. Professor John E. Kennedy, with re-
markable diligence, has subjected § 60(a) to the rigors of logical analysis. Con-
sidering only the "property other than real" provisions, Kennedy found fifty-six
logical sentence-statements in § 60 which when strung together in proper logical
interconnection, occupy five single-spaced typewritten pages.
The present section 60(a) is, by anyone's standards, highly verbose and
repetitious. It is, as Professor Laube says, "representative of a somewhat
windblown and redundant style of draftsmanship," and as Professor
Moore characterizes, of a kind "which at once would have astonished and
delighted Gilbert and Sullivan. . . .The [19501 amendment was the
work product of new blood on the National Bankruptcy Conference
which felt that the expanded language was necessary to promote clarity
in dealing with complex concepts. Kennedy, Section 60(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act: An Attempt at Systematic Redrafting (unpublished
paper in Professor Kennedy's Office, College of Law, University of Ken-
tucky, Lexington, Kentucky).
147 Continental Ill. Natl Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 294 U.S. 648, 671
(1935),
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